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ABSTRACT
I study the relation between firm debt structure and future external financing
and investment. I find that greater reliance on long-term debt is associated with
increased access to external financing and ability to undertake profitable investments.
This contrasts with previous empirical results and theoretical predictions from the
agency cost literature, but it is consistent with predictions regarding rollover risk.
Furthermore, I find that firms with lower total debt (high debt capacity) have greater
access to new financing and investment. Lower leverage increases future debt issues
and capital expenditures, and firms do not fully rebalance by reducing the use of
external financing sources such as equity. Finally, my results support the view that
greater reliance on unsecured debt can increase future debt financing. Overall, my
paper offers new insights into how aspects of debt structure, in particular maturity,
are related ex-post to firms’ ability to raise new financing and invest.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
I study the relation between debt structure and future external financing and
investment. Theoretical models suggest that various characteristics of debt such as
maturity, security, and seniority can affect firms’ ability to access new debt and equity
and invest. However, our understanding of how these aspects of debt are actually
related to observed financing and investment is at best incomplete. This is in part
because the theoretical predictions are unclear and may conflict with one another
due to differences in assumptions and the specific channels they consider.1 More
importantly, the existing empirical studies on how debt structure may be related to
financing and investment take an indirect, ex-ante approach. This literature tests
whether debt structure is related to measures of growth opportunities,2 whether
debt characteristics can attenuate the negative relation between growth options and
leverage,3 and whether firms actively manage their debt structure in anticipation of
investment opportunities.4
Despite evidence of a causal effect from growth opportunities to debt structure,
1For example, the seminal work of Myers 1977 predicts that greater reliance on short-maturity
debt can improve access to future financing and investment because short-maturity debt mitigates
debt overhang, but the recent work of He and Xiong 2012 predicts that short-maturity debt can
reduce access to future financing because firms face more frequent rollover losses and a higher
likelihood of default.
2See, e.g., Barclay and Smith 1995a and Stohs and Mauer 1996.
3See, e.g., Johnson 2003 and Billett, King, and Mauer 2007.
4See, e.g., Goyal, Lehn, and Racic 2002, Giambona, Golec, and Lopez-de-Silanes 2015, and Callen
and Chy 2016.
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there is scarce empirical literature on whether firms’ ex-ante choices of maturity,
security, and priority characteristics translate into greater ex-post financing and
investment.5 For example, if a firm chooses a debt structure anticipating costly
underinvestment, does that debt structure actually allow them to invest more ex-post?
This lack of evidence is likely due to the difficulty of establishing a causal channel
from each aspect of debt structure to firm outcomes. As with any empirical capital
structure question, reverse causality and omitted variable bias make it difficult to
isolate a causal effect. However, the ex-post question is important because current
growth opportunities do not necessarily translate into future investment. Thus, we do
not know which of the theoretical predictions are borne out empirically because there
is no comprehensive study on how debt structure is related to observed financing and
investment outcomes.
Additionally, the existing empirical literature does little to separate the potential
mechanisms through which debt structure can theoretically affect financing and
investment. Many papers consider how debt maturity, security, and priority may
affect agency costs of debt (over- or underinvestment) by examining how firms that
anticipate agency costs change their debt structure. However, we know little about the
channel through which debt structure affects firm outcomes ex-post. For example, debt
maturity may affect financing and investment ex-post by mitigating the effects of debt
overhang—firms with more short-maturity debt are less subject to underinvestment
and are able to access new debt and equity and invest more. On the other hand,
maturity may also affect financing and investment by exposing the firm to greater
rollover risk—firms with more short-maturity debt may have less access to external
5To my knowledge, only Aivazian, Ge, and Qui 2005, Dang 2011, and Biguri 2016 address the
causal effect of debt characteristics on firm outcomes. However, these papers only focus on a single
aspect of debt and only consider a causal effect on investment, not financing.
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financing and less investment during times when refinancing is costly. The existing
literature cannot say whether the agency cost or rollover risk channel dominates
ex-post and for which types of firms each channel is most important.
My paper addresses these gaps in the literature by linking debt structure to
observed external financing and investment and trying to establish a causal channel. I
consider the total level of debt, the maturity profile, the mix of secured and unsecured
debt, and the mix of senior and junior/subordinated debt. These debt characteristics
are motivated in large part by the literature on how firm debt structure can mitigate
agency costs, particularly debt overhang and the associated underinvestment. Maturity,
security, and priority of current debt directly affect a firm’s ability to finance new
investment with new equity and debt. Therefore, firms may rely on a greater degree
of short-term debt or a greater proportion of unsecured or lower priority debt in their
current capital structure if they anticipate costly agency problems.6
I measure access to external financing and investment using both new issues of
debt and equity as well as net issuance (new issues net of reductions). Furthermore, I
exploit large, “proactive” increases in debt and equity (as identified and defined by
Denis and McKeon 2012 and McKeon 2015) to obtain additional results. These are
substantial new financing transactions that indicate a large amount of new financing
capacity. Furthermore, they can be tied to a particular use of funds, e.g., acquisitions
or increases in internal capital expenditures. As such, they provide a unique setting for
further understanding how debt structure is related to the ability of firms to finance
major investment with new debt and equity.
My key results show that reliance on short-maturity debt may be associated with
lower access to financing and investment. A greater proportion of debt maturing
6See, e.g., Myers 1977, Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1980, and Stulz and Johnson 1985.
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in 1-3 years is associated with less net debt financing, a higher future cost of both
debt and equity, a lower probability of large, investment-motivated debt issues, and
lower capital expenditures. The relation is economically meaningful—a one standard
deviation increase in the proportion of short-maturity debt is associated with 32%
lower average net debt issuance. This is not driven by the presence of call options
that can effectively shorten the maturity of debt that matures in more than three
years, as the results are robust to an alternative measure of maturity that accounts for
callability. Nor is it driven by the presence of bank debt, which typically has shorter
maturity than publicly-offered bonds, as the results are robust to the inclusion of
bank debt as a control variable. Therefore, short-maturity debt may actually reduce
external financing capacity and investment.
Although this is consistent with a rollover risk channel, in which short-term
debt can reduce future debt capacity because of a higher probability of default,7 it
contrasts with much of the theoretical literature that finds short-maturity debt may
enhance future financing and investment by reducing or eliminating the effects of debt
overhang.8 Additionally, my results call into question the interpretation of previous
empirical studies that show that firms ex-ante select into shorter-maturity debt
structures when the cost of debt overhang increases. For example, Giambona, Golec,
and Lopez-de-Silanes 2015 show that an exogenous increase in growth opportunities
(which makes debt overhang costlier) results in firms shortening their debt maturity,
which they interpret as firms’ attempts to mitigate debt overhang. While this may
7See, e.g., He and Xiong 2012 and He and Milbradt 2016.
8See, e.g., Myers 1977, Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1980, Childs, Mauer, and Ott 2005, and
Titman and Tsyplakov 2007.
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be true, my results show that firms that maintain more short-maturity debt may
ultimately have less access to new financing ex-post.
My results further show that the current total level of debt is strongly and negatively
related to future financing and investment. A higher level of total debt is associated
with lower future debt financing and investment, and a higher future cost of both debt
and equity. The effects are economically meaningful, with a one standard deviation
increase in book leverage implying lower net debt issuance of 4.4%, which is nearly
twice the average net debt issuance. A one standard deviation increase in book
leverage is also associated with 14% lower average investment. Furthermore, higher
debt is associated with a lower probability of large, “proactive” increases in debt and
equity that are motivated by the desire to increase long-term investment.
This is not simply the result of rebalancing, in which a firm substitutes equity
for debt in order to lower its leverage ratio, because pure rebalancing would imply
no change in total financing and investment. On the contrary, my results show both
lower total financing and investment for firms with high leverage. Additionally, the
results are unlikely to be driven by a mechanical feedback effect from growth options
to leverage, whereby growth options increase the market value of the firm and depress
total leverage (Berens and Cuny 1995; Tserlukevich 2008). My main measure of total
debt is book leverage, which should be less sensitive to changes in growth options
than market leverage, and I also conduct robustness checks using only the subsample
of firms that are likely to have more valuable growth options. Both tests indicate that
the presence of growth options cannot fully explain why low total debt is associated
with greater future investment.
The negative relation between total leverage and future debt issuance and invest-
ment may be due to several channels. Higher debt may reduce future debt capacity,
5
and hence the ability to finance new investment with debt, either by increasing the
probability of default or by putting a firm beyond its debt capacity in the sense of
Myers and Majluf 1984. Higher debt may also impose greater debt overhang (Myers
1977), which can lead firms to underinvest in positive NPV projects. The latter
channel would predict lower equity issuance. Because I find future debt issuance to
be more affected than future equity issuance, I conclude that the association between
total debt and future financing and investment is primarily due to a debt capacity
channel, as opposed to an agency cost channel.
Finally, I find that unsecured debt weakly increases future net debt issuance, but
has an ambiguous effect on future investment. The relation with debt issuance is
consistent with the predictions of, e.g., Stulz and Johnson 1985 and Hackbarth and
Mauer 2012 who show that firms can preserve the option to issue new secured or senior
debt in the future by relying on more unsecured or lower priority debt in the present.
The ability to issue secured or more senior debt to finance investment mitigates the
effect of debt overhang, allowing firms to increase their future issuance of debt and
equity.
These results are important because they provide new insights into how current
debt, and in particular its maturity, is related to future financial and real outcomes. In
contrast to existing empirical literature,9 my results show how debt maturity, security,
and priority are related to observed financing and investment. Furthermore, none
of the current studies have documented a negative relation between short-maturity
debt and ex-post debt issuance and investment.10 Thus my findings call into question
9See Barclay and Smith 1995a, Barclay and Smith 1995b, Goyal, Lehn, and Racic 2002, Johnson
2003, Billett, King, and Mauer 2007, and Giambona, Golec, and Lopez-de-Silanes 2015.
10Aivazian, Ge, and Qui 2005 examine how maturity is related to future investment and find a
positive relation between short-maturity debt and investment. However, their study does not consider
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the interpretation of previous empirical evidence and suggest that the rollover risk
channel, not the agency cost channel, dominates on average.
The results are also important because my paper addresses potential endogeneity in
a number of ways and attempts to establish a causal link between debt structure and
firm outcomes. The existing literature takes an ex-ante approach primarily because
establishing causality is difficult. There is the potential that reverse causality or a
common, omitted factor drive an observed ex-post relation between debt structure and
financing and investment.11 I account for reverse causality by splitting my sample by
ex-ante measures of growth opportunities and financial constraints, and by splitting
it into core and noncore business segments.12 I address the possibility of selection
on unobservable factors by including a variety of controls and fixed effects, and by
implementing the econometric test detailed in Oster 2015. I also estimate a dynamic
model that allows for financing and investment to revert to a long-run target over
time. Both sets of tests indicate that it is unlikely my results are driven primarily by
either reverse causality or selection on unobservables.
As an additional method of establishing causality, I identify points at which debt
structure is likely to be “suboptimal.” Because firms should never select ex-ante into
suboptimal debt characteristics if they expect profitable investment opportunities, a
significant relation between suboptimal debt structure and financing and investment
the security and priority of debt, nor do they examine the relation between maturity and future
financing.
11Reverse causality would arise if firms anticipate the need for financing to fund investment at
time t and thus select into a particular debt structure at t− 1. Correlation with a common, omitted
factor would arise if there is some unobservable variable that is correlated with both debt structure
and the outcome variables.
12The core vs. noncore split was first suggested by Lang, Ofek, and Stulz 1996 as a way to address
reverse causality.
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should be more indicative of a causal effect. I identify major refinancings that are
motivated by the desire to change capital structure,13 and I assume that debt structure
in the years immediately preceding these refinancings is suboptimal (otherwise firms
would not undertake a capital structure-motivated refinancing in the first place). I
find that both total debt and short-maturity debt remain negatively related to future
financing and investment at times when debt structure is suboptimal, which further
suggests a causal effect of these debt characteristics.
Although more work must be done to fully account for reverse causality in particular,
I argue that my results are unlikely to be driven purely by reverse causality. The
existence of reverse causality would imply that firms believe debt structure can have a
“causal” effect on financing and investment outcomes, otherwise they would not select
a specific debt structure ex-ante. Furthermore, my results are broadly consistent with
the findings of existing empirical literature that attempts to use exogenous variation
in debt structure to establish causality.14
Finally, my results for maturity in particular are important no matter the extent
to which the regression coefficients pick up ex-ante selection vs. causality. On the one
hand, if the results are actually driven by reverse causality, then firms are selecting into
longer-term debt in anticipation of the future need for financing and investment. This
would run counter to the interpretation of most of the existing empirical literature.
On the other hand, if the results are primarily causal, then reliance on short-maturity
debt does not actually mitigate the effects of debt overhang ex-post. This would
contrast with a large set of theoretical predictions regarding how short-term debt can
13The methodology is based on Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 2001, Hovakimian 2004, Leary
and Roberts 2005, and Korteweg, Schwert, and Strebulaev 2014.
14See Almeida et al. 2011 and Cohen, Katz, and Sadka 2016.
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eliminate underinvestment incentives of equity holders. Thus, in either case, the novel
results for maturity run counter to existing literature.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses literature
and motivates the link between current debt structure and future financing and
investment. Chapter 3 outlines the data and empirical methodology, Chapters 4
and 5 discuss results, Chapter 6 outlines future work and extensions, and Chapter 7
concludes.
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Chapter 2
RELATED LITERATURE
A large theoretical literature shows that debt structure can enhance or detract
from firms’ ability to access external financing. In this paper I consider four aspects
of debt structure: (1) the total level of debt, (2) the mix of short- vs. long-maturity
debt, (3) the mix of secured vs. unsecured debt, and (4) the mix of senior and
junior/subordinated debt. Debt contract features such as covenants and call options
are additional aspects of debt that may be related to financing and investment, and
although I do not focus on these in my primary empirical analysis, I discuss briefly
the literature related to these aspects of debt as well.
The literature generally agrees that a higher total level of debt can reduce future
financing and investment through a number of channels. As outlined in Myers and
Majluf 1984 and Myers 1984, a modified pecking order view of capital structure would
predict that firms have a particular “debt capacity” beyond which financing with
additional debt becomes very costly. This would imply that firms that are close to
or at capacity are less able to access new debt. On the other hand, firms that are
far away from their debt capacity are more able to obtain new debt financing and
exercise growth options. A higher level of debt may also reduce future debt capacity
via a standard tradeoff theory channel of Modigliani and Miller 1963. If, as in Leland
1994, firms trade off the tax benefits of higher debt with the cost of increased risk of
distress or bankruptcy, then a high level of existing debt may reduce the ability or
desire to issue more debt in the future.
Finally, total debt may affect future debt and equity financing because existing
10
risky debt can create debt overhang (Myers 1977). Equity holders in a firm with a
large amount of outstanding debt may underinvest in positive NPV projects if they
anticipate that existing debt holders will reap a large portion of the gains at their
expense. This implies that higher levels of existing debt can reduce both new equity
and debt issuance and thus limit a firm’s ability to exercise valuable growth options.
The recent work of Sunderesan, Wang, and Yang 2015 offers further support for the
debt overhang channel in a dynamic setting. They show that optimal leverage is lower
for firms that expect to exercise valuable growth options in the future.
From both a debt capacity and agency cost perspective, a higher level of debt is
associated with lower future financing and investment. Various characteristics of debt,
however, can enhance or diminish financing and investment conditional on a given
level of total debt.
A higher proportion of short-maturity debt can affect future debt issuance because
it provides a firm with more frequent opportunities to roll over or refinance. This in
turn creates more frequent opportunities for a firm to increase its total debt level (by
either rolling over the entire amount and also issuing new debt, or by allowing all
debt to mature and issuing more), or reduce its total debt (by allowing some or all of
the debt to mature). A greater ability to adjust total debt increases a firm’s ability to
respond to positive investment shocks or negative profitability shocks.
Short-maturity debt may also affect financing and investment by mitigating or
eliminating the effects of debt overhang (see, e.g., Myers 1977; Childs, Mauer, and
Ott 2005; and Titman and Tsyplakov 2007). This is possible because of the timing of
when short-term debt matures relative to when the firm wants to exercise its growth
option. If the short-term debt matures prior to when the firm wishes to invest, then
shareholders can make the investment decision as if the firm was all equity financed.
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They can issue new debt to fund the investment, and because the new debt will be
priced such that the benefits will not accrue to debt holders, the underinvestment
problem is entirely resolved. Even if the debt matures after the investment is made,
short-term debt can at the very least mitigate underinvestment.
Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1980 argue that short-term debt can mitigate a
different agency cost of debt: risk-shifting. If equity holders can benefit from shifting
into a higher-risk, lower-return project at the expense of bond holders, then they may
face a higher ex-ante cost of debt, as bond holders will rationally discount the price
at which they are willing to purchase debt. This would imply lower debt capacity, all
else equal. Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1980 show that short maturity can mitigate
this investment distortion because the value of short-maturity debt is less sensitive
to an increase in risk than the value of longer-maturity debt, hence bond holders are
expropriated less. Leland and Toft 1996 also suggest risk-shifting as an explanation
for the observed reliance on short-term debt. They argue that long-maturity debt
allows for larger debt capacity and higher tax shields, therefore the propensity for
firms to use short-term debt must be explained by the existence of bond holder-stock
holder conflict over investment policy.
Despite the potential for short-maturity debt to increase firms’ ability to finance
growth options with new debt or equity by reducing agency costs of debt, the literature
also suggests that greater reliance on short-term debt can expose a firm to more frequent
rollover losses. This in turn can reduce future financing and investment. For example,
the recent work of He and Xiong 2012 and He and Milbradt 2016 predict that more
short-maturity debt can increase the incentive of equity holders to default early. This
is because a larger amount of short-maturity debt means more frequent refinancing,
and if equity holders must absorb refinancing losses (the difference between the face
12
value of maturing bonds and the proceeds from issuing the new debt), then they
choose to default sooner. This implies lower debt capacity ex-ante.
Related to maturity, the presence of covenants that allow debt to be called prior to
the stated maturity date may also affect financing and investment. Call options allow
firms to effectively shorten their debt maturity and can thus limit both underinvestment
and overinvestment in the same way as short-term debt (Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet
1980).
In addition to maturity, the mix of secured and unsecured, or senior and junior,
debt can also affect financing and investment by mitigating the effects of debt overhang.
Stulz and Johnson 1985 show that the ability of firms to issue new, secured debt
allows them to undertake investment opportunities they would otherwise forgo if they
had to be financed with unsecured debt or equity. This is because the new debt can be
secured by the investment, which limits the ability of existing unsecured debt holders
to capture the benefits. In a dynamic model in which firms can issue debt and invest
in multiple periods, Hackbarth and Mauer 2012 assume firms can prioritize debt issues
in a way that minimizes over- and underinvestment. Like the static results of Stulz
and Johnson 1985, their model predicts that issuing more senior debt today can lead
to future underinvestment but can also mitigate future overinvestment. Thus, a key
implication of their model is that the choice of whether to prioritize the current debt
issue or future debt issues (or to make them equal priority) may impact whether the
firm invests in the future.
Additional aspects of debt that may affect future financing and investment through
their effects on agency costs of debt include restrictive covenants. Covenants that
limit dividend payments, for example, may reduce underinvestment because they limit
13
the ability of firms to pay out cash that otherwise would have been used for positive
NPV projects (Myers 1977; Smith and Warner 1979).
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Chapter 3
DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
3.1 Data
My primary data sample consists of North American Compustat firms from 1978-
2015. I require that each firm-year have greater than $10 million in assets in order
to be included in the sample, and I exclude observations that are missing any of the
explanatory variables required for my primary tests. I exclude utilities and financial
firms.
Table 1 provides variable definitions, and Table 2 shows summary statistics. I
consider four aspects of debt as constituting a firm’s debt structure: the total level,
the maturity structure, the security profile, and the seniority profile. I measure the
total level of debt as book leverage (Book_lev): book value of debt divided by book
value of assets.
In line with existing empirical studies, I define maturity structure in terms of the
proportion of short-maturity debt. In particular, I define Short −maturity as the
ratio of long-term debt maturing within the next three years to total debt. I construct
the numerator by summing Compustat items DD1, DD2, and DD3 (the proportion
of long-term debt maturing in one, two, and three years, respectively). This measure
is identical to the maturity measures used in Johnson 2003 and Billett, King, and
Mauer 2007.15
15This variable is the complement to the measure used in Barclay and Smith 1995a in that they
use the proportion of long-term debt maturing in more than three years in the denominator.
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Finally, I define security and priority structure based on the extent to which
firms use unsecured or junior/subordinated debt in their current capital structure.
Consistent with the previous literature, I define Unsecured as the ratio of unsecured
debt to total debt, where unsecured debt is the difference between total debt and
secured debt (Compustat item dm). I define Subordinated as the ratio of subordinated
unsecured debt to total unsecured debt.
I use measures of debt and equity financing and investment as my outcomes
variables. My primary measures of debt financing are new debt issuance (dissue),
which is defined as increases in long-term debt (Compustat item dltis) scaled by
lagged total assets, and net debt issuance (ndissue), which is defined as long-term
debt increases net of reductions (item dltis minus dltr) scaled by lagged total assets.
Similarly, my primary measures of equity financing are new equity issuance (eissue),
which is defined as the sale of common and preferred stock (Compustat item sstk)
scaled by lagged total assets, and net equity issuance (neissue), which is equal to the
issue of new stock net of repurchases (item sstk minus prstkc) scaled by lagged total
assets. I define two additional measures that capture total external financing: net
external financing (netexternal), which is equal to the sum of ndissue and neissue,
and new external financing (newexternal), which is equal to the sum of dissue and
eissue. The latter measure captures the extent to which firms engage in new financing,
whereas the former captures the net effect of changes in bond and stock issuance
and reductions/repurchases. Finally, I define investment (investment) as capital
expenditures scaled by lagged total assets.
As an alternative measure of firms’ access to new financing and ability to invest, I
construct three measures of large, new debt and equity issues. The ability to engage
in a large new debt or equity issue to fund, e.g., a major acquisition, indicates a high
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degree of access to low-cost external financing. To measure large financing choices
that are used primarily for long-term investment, I follow methodology derived from
Denis and McKeon 2012 to define transactions that I call large, proactive increases in
debt or equity (LPIDs and LPIEs, respectively).16 In unreported robustness tests, I
also define and use a second measure of large equity increases based on McKeon 2015
which I refer to as Sstk3.17 This variable indicates whether the firm issued new stock
equal to 3% or more of its total equity in a given year.
As shown in Table 3, the debt structure measures are not highly correlated.
The largest magnitude correlations are between total debt and the proportion of
subordinated debt (0.22 Pearson and 0.30 Spearman), and between total debt and
short-maturity debt (-0.23 Pearson and -0.22 Spearman). The remaining correlation
coefficients are between 0.01 and 0.21 in absolute value.
3.2 Regression Model
I construct my main empirical specification to estimate the relation between debt
structure and future financing and investment as defined in the previous subsection.
I estimate:
Yi,t = β0 + β1Book_Levi,t−1 + β2Short_Maturityi,t−1 +
+β3Unsecuredi,t−1 + β4Subordinatedi,t−1 + βxConti,t−1 + i,t (3.1)
The dependent variable is one of the following: dissue, eissue, newexternal, ndissue,
neissue, netexternal, or investment. The right-hand side variables are one-year
16Denis and McKeon 2012 only focus on large, proactive increases in debt. However, I use their
methodology to define a symmetric transaction for increases in equity.
17See Appendix for a detailed explanation of how these variables are defined.
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lagged levels of the four debt characteristics of interest. Control variables include
firm characteristics such as market-to-book, size, tangibility, dividend paying status,
R&D, cash holdings, profitability, trade credit, a rating dummy, as well as firm and
year fixed effects.18 The year fixed effects are included to control for time variation in
debt structure. Custodio, Ferreira, and Laureano 2013, for example, show that the
percentage of debt maturing in more than 3 years has decreased substantially from
1976 to 2008.
The relation between debt and future financing and investment may be more
obvious, however, in the context of large financing and investment choices. Therefore,
I also estimate how the debt structure measures are related to the two types of large
financing transactions I discussed in the previous subsection: LPIDs and LPIEs:
Largei,t = β0 + β1Book_Levi,t−1 + β2Short_Maturityi,t−1 +
+β3Unsecuredi,t−1 + β4Subordinatedi,t−1 + βxConti,t−1 + i,t (3.2)
where the dependent variable is one of two variables: (1) LPIDi,t, which is a dummy
equal to 1 if firm i engages in a large, proactive increase in debt in year t, and 0
otherwise; or (2) LPIEi,t, which is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i engaged in a large,
proactive increase in equity in year t, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables of
interest and controls are the same as in equation 3.1, and I use industry-by-year fixed
effects. I estimate the equation as a linear probability model.
18These firm characteristics are widely used in the previous literature, e.g., Rajan and Zingales
1995, Frank and Goyal 2003, and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender 2008. Consistent with the findings
of Koh and Reeb 2014, I account for missing R&D expenses by replacing missing R&D equal to 0
while also including a dummy variable equal to 1 for missing R&D. Koh and Reeb 2014 illustrate the
importance of including a dummy variable for missing R&D rather than simply replacing missing
with 0.
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3.2.1 Dynamic Panel Model
Equation 3.1 does not assume adjustment to optimal financing or investment over
time, but existing literature documents that firms may adjust to an optimal capital
structure over time.19 Therefore, to ensure the robustness of the results from equation
3.1, I specify an alternative equation that allows for reversion of capital structure over
time.
Following Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender 2008 and other empirical papers, I specify
a dynamic model that allows for firms’ external financing and investment to depend
partially on adjustment to an optimal level:
Yi,t = β0 + β1Book_Levi,t−1 + β2Short_Maturityi,t−1 +
+β3Unsecuredi,t−1 + β4Subordinatedi,t−1 + β5Yi,t−1 + βxConti,t−1 + i,t (3.3)
The inclusion of lagged financing or investment on the right-hand side of equation
3.3 (via the term Yi,t−1) captures the tendency of the dependent variables to revert to
a long-run optimal level over time. However, including a lagged dependent variable
can pose problems if equation 3.1 is estimated using OLS, because Yi,t−1 will be
correlated with an individual firm effect. To account for this, I follow the GMM
estimation methodology proposed by Arellano and Bond 1991 and used in several
previous papers.20 This method first differences equation 3.3 and uses all of the lagged
values of the regressors Yi,t as instruments. In line with existing studies, I implement
the GMM estimation via the Stata module xtabond.
19See, e.g., Leary and Roberts 2005, Flannery and Rangan 2006, Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender
2008, and Marchica and Mura 2010.
20See, e.g., Aivazian, Ge, and Qui 2005, Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender 2008, and Marchica and
Mura 2010.
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The GMM methodology is further justified by the fact that debt structure is
persistent over time. The AR(1) coefficients for the levels of the debt structure
variables are 0.86 for book leverage, 0.62 for short-maturity, 0.76 for unsecured, and
0.80 for subordinated. In contrast, the differences of the debt structure variables
exhibit AR(1) coefficients of −0.1 for total debt, −0.26 for short-maturity, −0.22
for unsecured, and −0.14 for subordinated. The first-differenced data is much less
persistent, indicating that the use of differences may be more suitable. Because the
GMM method first-differences the data (to eliminate the firm fixed effect), it also
accounts for the problems that may arise as a result of persistence in the right-hand
side variables of interest.21
21See footnotes 18 and 19 in Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender 2008 for a discussion.
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Chapter 4
RESULTS
4.1 Maturity
Table 4 illustrates that the primary measure of short-term debt, the proportion of
total debt maturing within 1-3 years (Short−maturity), is associated with greater
new debt financing (column 1) and total new external financing (column 3). Although
these results would appear consistent with the existing empirical literature, the
remaining results suggest that short-term debt may actually reduce future financing
and investment. Column 6 shows that Short−maturity is associated with lower net
debt issuance, indicating that although firms issue more new debt, the simultaneous
reductions of existing debt are larger in magnitude. The coefficient indicates that
a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of debt maturing in 1-3 years
is associated with an economically meaningful decrease of 32% of average net debt
issuance. There is no statistically significant relation with net equity issuance and
thus the effect on combined net debt and equity financing is negative and significant
(column 8). Furthermore, column 9 indicates that more short-term debt is associated
with less future investment—the coefficient implies a decrease of 0.2% in investment
for a one standard deviation increase in Short−maturity
The view that short-maturity debt may actually reduce debt financing and invest-
ment is further supported by column 4 of Table 4, which shows that Short−maturity
is negatively associated with the probability of a large, proactive increase in debt
(LPID). The coefficient indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the
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proportion of debt maturing in 1-3 years is associated with a 0.9% lower probability
of engaging in a LPID, which is economically meaningful given that the unconditional
probability of a LPID is 9.9%. Short−maturity is not significantly related to a large,
proactive increase in equity (LPIE) (column 5).
The results for LPIDs and LPIEs are important for two reasons. First, the debt
and equity transactions used on the left-hand side are tied primarily to increases
in long-term investment—acquisitions or capital expenditures—as opposed to other
uses of funds. Thus, the strong, negative relation in column 4 and the statistically
insignificant relation in column 5 further supports the finding that short-maturity
debt may actually reduce overall external financing and investment. Second, the
LPID and LPIE transactions are major financing choices that indicate substantial
access to external financing. Although there is no way to “net” the LPIDs and LPIEs,
the relative sizes of the coefficients on Short−maturity in columns 4 and 5 suggest
that greater reliance on short-maturity debt lowers the likelihood of a large financing
transaction “on net.”
One interpretation of the negative sign between short-maturity debt and future net
debt issuance (column 6) is the following: firms with shorter-maturity debt are more
able to reduce their level of debt in the face of a negative shock to profitability, which
allows them to avoid financial distress (see Dangl and Zechner 2016). Firms hit with
a negative shock optimally respond by lowering their net debt issuance regardless, but
a greater proportion of short-term debt should allow a firm to do this more quickly. If
this is the case, then the negative relation between short-maturity debt and future
net debt issuance may not indicate that short-maturity debt reduces access to new
debt financing.
In order to understand whether the negative relation between Short−maturity and
22
net debt issuance is driven by firms that are optimally reducing their debt in response
to being close to distress, I split the sample into firms with negative profitability
and firms with zero or positive profitability. Firms with negative profitability should
reduce debt more than firms with nonnegative profitability, so if the debt reduction
motive is driving the results, the association between maturity and net debt issuance
should be stronger in the sample of negative profitability firms. Table 9 shows the
results of reestimating equation 3.1 on these two subsamples. The negative relation
between Short−maturity and net debt remains significant in the subsample of firms
with nonnegative profitability, further indicating that the negative relation is a sign of
reduced access to new debt financing rather than an optimal response to a shock.
The maturity results contrast with the interpretation of previous empirical evidence.
Much of the theoretical literature finds that short-maturity debt enhances access to
future financing by reducing or eliminating the effects of debt overhang. Empirically,
Barclay and Smith 1995a show that firms with higher growth opportunities have more
short-term debt, and Johnson 2003 and Billett, King, and Mauer 2007 show that
short maturity reduces the negative relation between growth options and leverage.
Goyal, Lehn, and Racic 2002 and Giambona, Golec, and Lopez-de-Silanes 2015 provide
evidence that firms ex-ante choose shorter (longer) maturity when access to future
financing becomes more (less) valuable as measured by changes in future growth
options.
Based on correlations between maturity and growth opportunities, or on the
effect of maturity on the growth options-leverage relation, these studies conclude that
short-maturity debt is used by firms to mitigate underinvestment. While it may be
true that firms’ maturity structure responds ex-ante to changes in expectations about
future investment, my results suggest that, ex-post, firms’ overall debt issuance and
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ability to engage in large, new debt financing to fund investment may not be higher.
Because firms do not appear to fully substitute this shortfall with equity, overall,
more short-term debt may be associated with a lack of access to new financing and
investment.
4.1.1 Discussion
Overall, the results suggest a negative relation between short-maturity debt and
future investment that contrasts with theoretical predictions regarding how short-
maturity debt can mitigate debt overhang. Additionally, the results are seemingly at
odds with two previous empirical studies, Aivazian, Ge, and Qui 2005 and Dang 2011,
that document a negative relation between long-term debt and future investment.
Although these papers employ a specification that is different than equation 3.1, I
nevertheless check the robustness of my results by estimating the investment-cash flow
sensitivity model employed in both Aivazian, Ge, and Qui 2005 and Dang 2011. The
results, not reported, show that my measure of short-maturity debt remains negative
although it loses significance. Because I do not find the significant positive relation
between short-maturity debt and investment documented in Aivazian, Ge, and Qui
2005 and Dang 2011, I conclude that the differences in results are due to differences
in specifications.
The negative relation documented in Table 4 is consistent, however, with the
rollover channel described in the recent work of He and Xiong 2012 and He and
Milbradt 2016. Their models predict that more short-maturity debt can increase
the incentive of equity holders to default early. This is because a larger amount of
short-maturity debt means more frequent refinancing, and if equity holders must
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absorb refinancing losses (the difference between the face value of maturing bonds and
the proceeds from issuing the new debt), then they choose to default sooner. This
implies lower debt capacity, and hence reduced external financing ability, ex-ante.
4.1.2 Call Provisions
My main measures of debt structure do not explicitly account for call provisions.
Call provisions may shorten the effective maturity of debt because they allow firms to
repurchase and retire bonds prior to their stated maturity date. Barnea, Haugen, and
Senbet 1980 show that long-maturity debt with call provisions is equally as effective
as short-maturity debt at mitigating agency costs. Therefore, it is possible that the
positive relation between long-maturity debt and future debt issuance and investment
that I observe may be driven by the presence of call provisions in long-term debt. In
other words, the results in Table 4 may be entirely the result of the way I define short
maturity.
I check the robustness of the maturity results by accounting for the presence of call
provisions. I use bond-level data from Mergent FISD and S&P Capital IQ to measure
the presence of call options in a firm’s outstanding, publicly-traded debt issues. I
merge this data to the Compustat data I use for the main empirical tests.
In order to understand how the presence of call provisions in long-term debt
affects the relation between maturity and future financing and investment, I use the
bond-level data to construct an alternative measure of “maturity” which I refer to
as Short − effective −maturity. I take the long-term debt maturing in 1-3 years
(Compustat items DD1, DD2, and DD3) and add to it the long-term debt that
matures in more than 3 years but that is callable in 3 years or less. The rationale for
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this measure is that I capture not only “true” short-maturity debt, but also debt that
is effectively short-maturity by virtue of the fact that it can be called within 3 years.
I then scale this sum by total long-term debt. Thus, the resulting variable captures
the proportion of long-term debt that either matures in 1-3 years or can be called in
1-3 years.
I determine the amount of long-term debt that is callable in 1-3 years in each
year t by calculating the difference between the year of the next call date (Capital
IQ variable IQ_NEXT_CALL_DATE) and year t.22 In order to avoid overlap
with the main measure of maturity, Short−maturity, I take only debt that matures
beyond 3 years relative to t. As an example, assume a bond matures at t = 2005
and has a next call date of t = 2003. Then at t = 2000, I would consider that bond
callable within 3 years but maturing beyond 3 years. Hence, this bond would be
considered long-term debt that is callable in 1-3 years but that matures beyond 3
years and would thus be included in my new measure of maturity. Mathematically,
the new measure of maturity is calculated as follows:
DD1 +DD2 +DD3 + CallableLT
TD
where DD1, DD2, and DD3 are the debt maturing in 1, 2, and 3 years, respectively,
CallableLT is debt maturing in more than 3 years but that is callable within 3
years, and TD is total debt. In other words, this new measure is equivalent to
Short−maturity plus CallableLT
TD
.23
22Callable bonds typically have a “protection period” during which they cannot be called. Xu
2015 suggests that it is standard practice to set the protection period to at least half of the maturity
at issuance. E.g., a bond issued with maturity of ten years will have a call protection period of five
years.
23When data for callability is missing (i.e., when the measure Short− effective−maturity is
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I reestimate equations 3.1 and 3.2 using the alternative measure of maturity on
the right-hand side and report the results in Table 5. For the sake of brevity, I omit
the results for new debt and equity and net debt and equity. The relation between
the measure of effective maturity and new total financing (column 1) is positive and
significant, consistent with the results in Table 4. Column 2 shows that the measure
of effective maturity has a negative, albeit statistically insignificant, relation with net
external financing, and column 3 illustrates a negative and significant relation with
future investment. The relation between effective maturity and the probability of a
LPID (LPIE) is negative (positive), albeit statistically insignificant.
Taken together, the results in Table 5 do not suggest that the presence of call options
in debt that matures beyond 3 years is driving the main results for Short−maturity.
In other words, it is unlikely that the way I define short maturity debt in the main
specification is driving the negative relation between short maturity and future
financing and investment. Although the new measure of short-maturity debt is
statistically insignificant for net external financing and the probability of a large
new debt issue, the fact that the signs are consistent with the main sample results
is reassuring. If debt callability were explaining why a greater proportion of short-
maturity debt is associated with lower external financing and investment, then the
new measure of maturity should be positive and significant.
missing), I replace it with the main measure of maturity, Short−maturity. Thus, my measure of
effective maturity potentially understates the degree to which long-term debt that matures beyond 3
years is callable within 3 years.
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4.1.3 Bank Debt
The main sample results do not distinguish between publicly-traded and bank debt.
To the extent that bank loans in particular are likely to be shorter maturity than
publicly-offered bonds, the negative relation between the proportion of short-maturity
debt and future financing and investment may be the result of a correlation between
bank debt and future outcomes. In order to gauge whether bank debt drives the results,
I use S&P Capital IQ data, which breaks down debt types into several categories,
including term loans and revolving credit. Because the granular debt data is only
available beginning in 2002, the sample period is very limited relative to the full
sample that uses Compustat data.
I test the sensitivity of the results by including the proportion of total debt
that is term loans and revolving credit as a control in equations 3.1 and 3.2 in
order to capture the impact of bank debt. If the short-term nature of term lending
and/or revolving credit facilities is driving the maturity-financing/investment relation,
explicitly including a measure of bank lending on the right-hand side should weaken
the coefficient on Short−maturity. I create a new variable, Bankdebt, by summing
the amount of term loans and withdrawn revolving credit in each year and dividing
the result by total debt. The mean (median) of this measure is 21% (0%), with a
standard deviation of 0.36, during the years for which I have data (2002 onward).
The sample correlation between this variable and Short −maturity is 0.07, which
suggests that firms with more short-maturity debt do not necessarily have a larger
proportion of bank debt.
Table 6 reports the results of estimating equations 3.1 and 3.2 using the measure
of bank debt on the right-hand side. For the sake of brevity, I only include the
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measures of total financing, investment, and the probability of large debt and equity
issues. The variable Bankdebt is positively related to new external financing and
negatively related to investment, similar to Short − maturity. However, it is not
significantly related to net external financing or the probability of large new debt
issues. More importantly, including Bankdebt on the right-hand side does not weaken
the explanatory power of the main measure of short-maturity debt. Thus, the results
in Table 6 do not suggest that the maturity results are simply picking up a relation
between bank debt and future financing and investment.
4.2 Total Level of Debt
Table 4 illustrates that a higher level of book leverage is associated with a signif-
icantly lower probability of engaging in large, proactive increases in debt or equity.
The −0.31 coefficient indicates that a one standard deviation increase in book leverage
is associated with a 7.6% lower probability of a LPID, which is large relative to the
unconditional probability of 9.9% and as such is economically meaningful. The nega-
tive association between total debt and large, proactive increases in equity (column
5) suggests that, although higher leverage may have a positive effect on new equity
issuance (column 2), it has a significant negative effect on future large equity issues.
Finally, Table 4 shows that book leverage is significantly and negatively related
to future net debt issuance (column 6), and positively related to future net equity
issuance (column 7), although the effect on equity is much smaller. The coefficient
indicates that a one standard deviation increase in book leverage in the previous year is
associated with a roughly 4.5% decrease in net debt issuance, whereas a one standard
deviation increase is only associated with a 1.2% increase in net equity. Furthermore,
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total debt is also negatively related to net external financing (column 8), indicating
that combined debt and equity financing is lower following a period of higher leverage.
Finally, total debt is negatively related to investment, indicating that firms invest less
relative to their average in a period following higher leverage. The coefficient indicates
that a one standard deviation increase in book leverage is associated with a decrease
in investment of about 1% relative to average. Given average investment of 6.8%, this
is economically meaningful and equivalent to a decrease of 14% of average investment.
An obvious explanation for the negative relation between current debt and future
debt and equity financing is rebalancing: a firm with higher-than-optimal leverage
may reduce its leverage by lowering its debt and increasing equity. Although this
is likely part of the story, the results do not suggest it is the primary driver. Pure
rebalancing, in which the firm substitutes equity for debt, should result in no change
in total financing or investment. The fact that both investment and total net financing
decrease following a high level of debt indicates that the result cannot be driven entirely
by rebalancing. Furthermore, the evidence for large debt and equity issues suggests
that significant increases in both types of financing are less likely following a period of
high total debt, which would further indicate that it is not purely rebalancing.
Given that rebalancing is likely not the primary channel, the results are consistent
with the total amount of debt reducing financing and investment through either a
debt capacity channel or an agency cost channel. In the former, more debt reduces
future new debt capacity, leading to a lower ability to fund investment with new debt.
In the latter, higher debt is associated with lower future debt and equity financing
and investment. The two channels are not mutually exclusive, and the results suggest
that both are likely at work. The positive relation between past debt and future
equity financing supports the debt capacity channel, because if investment is lower
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primarily due to debt overhang, then equity issuance should be negatively affected.
On the other hand, total debt is also associated with a significantly lower probability
of a new large equity issue, which would support the debt overhang channel.
One possible alternative interpretation of the negative relation between total debt
and future investment is the mechanical effect of growth options. Because options
contribute positively to the value of the firm, they result in lower leverage ratios
(see, e.g., Berens and Cuny 1995, and Tserlukevich 2008). Therefore, it may appear
that the low-leverage firms raise more external financing and also invest more in the
future. However, my measure of total debt, book leverage, should be less sensitive to
growth options than market leverage, because the denominator is the book value, not
the market value, of assets. To further address this possbility, though, I reestimate
equation 3.1 on subsamples of firms that likely have more valuable options. In
particular, I measure yearly sales growth and define firms above the median to be
“high growth” firms.24 If the negative total debt and financing/investment relation is
driven primarily by the presence of growth options, then the effect should become
insignificant in a sample of firms that all have low growth opportunities. However,
I find that higher total debt is still associated with lower future net financing and
investment for low-growth firms, as shown in Table 8. Although the magnitude of the
coefficients is smaller than for the subsamples of high-growth firms, the effects are
still statistically significant, indicating that the feedback effect cannot be the primary
driver of the results.
24Billett, King, and Mauer 2007 advocate the use of sales growth as a measure of growth
opportunities that is an alternative to market-to-book ratio.
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4.3 Security and Priority
Table 4 illustrates that greater reliance on unsecured debt is negatively associated
with new financing but positively associated with net debt issuance (column 6) and
the probability of a LPID (column 5). The coefficient on unsecured debt in column 6
implies an increase of roughly 16% of average net debt issuance for a one standard
deviation increase. This finding is consistent with the predictions of Stulz and
Johnson 1985 and Hackbarth and Mauer 2012, who show that firms can “preserve
priority” for future debt in a way that facilitates future issues and minimizes over-
and underinvestment. More precisely, consistent with my results, relying primarily
on unsecured debt provides an option to issue both more unsecured and new senior
debt in the future, making effective costs smaller and debt issues more frequent.
Additionally, because existing risky debt creates debt overhang, secured debt allows
firms to undertake investment opportunities they would otherwise forgo if they had
to be financed via unsecured debt or equity. Finally, unsecured debt also encourages
new debt financing because issuing more senior debt dilutes the value of the claims of
existing debt holders. The resulting agency conflict however, has a potential to distort
investment and can result in lower firm value.
Despite this, greater reliance on unsecured debt is also associated with somewhat
lower net equity issuance and is negatively, albeit insignificantly, related to investment.
Thus, I cannot conclude that unsecured debt has a strong or robust relation with
future financing and investment.
Similarly, the priority structure of unsecured debt also does not appear to be ro-
bustly related to future financing and investment. Table 4 illustrates that having more
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subordinated debt is associated with higher net equity financing, but Subordinated is
statistically insignificant for the net debt financing and investment variables.
4.4 Dynamic Panel Results
As a robustness check on the results discussed in Chapters 4.1-4.3, I estimate
equation 3.3 using GMM and report the results in Table 7. I report coefficient
estimates for the one-period lags of the dependent variables (those variables with a “L.”
prefix), in addition to the other variables in equation 3.3. The statistical significance
of the lagged dependent variables illustrates the dynamic nature of financing and
investment.
Consistent with the results in Table 4, a higher level of total debt is negatively
associated with total net financing (column 2) and investment (column 3). The
economic magnitudes of the coefficients are qualitatively similar to those in Table 4.
Furthermore, the results for the proportion of short-maturity debt are also qualitatively
unchanged relative to Table 4. Column 1 shows that greater short-maturity debt is
associated with greater new external financing, but column 2 shows that it is associated
with less net external financing. Finally, column 3 shows that short-maturity debt
remains negative but loses significance in the investment equation.
Overall, the results in Table 7 show that, even after allowing for reversion in debt
and equity financing and investment over time, the measure of short-maturity debt
is negatively associated with net external financing and investment (although the
relation with investment is insignificant). Furthermore, total debt is negatively and
significantly associated with both measures of total external financing and investment.
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Thus, the key results are unchanged after allowing for adjustment behavior of the
dependent variables over time.
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Chapter 5
ROBUSTNESS
The full sample analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that a higher level of total debt
and a greater proportion of short-maturity debt are associated with lower future
financing and investment. The following chapter further investigates how these aspects
of debt are related to future outcomes and discusses how endogeneity may affect the
interpretation of the results.
5.1 Subsample Analysis
The full-sample results are for the average firm. In order to ensure that the results
are not being driven by a specific subset of firms, the following section examines
whether debt structure has a differential effect for certain types of firms relative to
others. I estimate equation 3.1 on three subsamples: (1) higher-growth firms, (2)
lower-profitability firms, and (3) financially constrained firms. Higher-growth firms
should value access to future financing more because more of their firm value is
embedded in growth options. Therefore, the cost of forgone investment is higher for
these firms. Low-profitability firms should value access to financing more because, all
else equal, they should be closer to financial distress than higher-profitability firms.
Financially constrained firms should value access to financing more because they have
lower ex-ante access to external sources of financing.
Given the greater value these types of firms should place on access to future
financing, the relation between debt structure and future debt, equity, and investment
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may be stronger for these three subsamples of firms. If these types of firms completely
drive the relation observed in the full sample (Table 4), then the coefficients should be
insignificant for the other set of firms. For example, if the only reason we observe a
negative maturity-investment relation on average (i.e., in the full sample) is because
ex-ante financially constrained firms exhibit this relation, then there should be no
significant relation between maturity and investment for ex-ante unconstrained firms.
I define the subsamples as follows. For high-growth firms, I take the set of firms
with yearly sales growth above the median. For low-profitability firms, I consider firms
with negative profitability. For financially constrained firms, I compute the financial
constraint index in Hadlock and Pierce 2010, which is a function of firm size and age.
The index is constructed as
SAi,t = (−.737 ∗ sizei,t) + .042 ∗ (size2i,t) + (−.040 ∗ agei,t)
where size is the log of book assets and age is the number of years for which the firm
has appeared in Compustat relative to year t. For example, if the firm has appeared
since 2000, and t = 2005, then age is equal to 5. A higher value of the index indicates
a more constrained firm. I use firms above the median value of the SA index as the
constrained subsample.
5.1.1 Results
Tables 8-10 show the results. I only include results for total new external financing,
total net external financing, and investment. In Table 8, I compare high- vs. low-
growth firms, where growth is defined in terms of yearly sales growth. Firms above
the median sales growth are considered high-growth firms. The effect of book leverage
on total net financing and investment is stronger for the subsample of high-growth
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firms, consistent with costlier agency conflicts for these firms. The primary measure of
short maturity, as shown in Table 8, continues to be significantly associated with lower
investment, and the effect is stronger in the high-growth subsample. As an alternative
to sales growth, I also partition the sample by market-to-book ratio (MTB), and
consider firms above the median to be high-growth firms. The results, not shown, are
qualitatively similar to the results for the sales growth partition.
In Table 9, I compare the relation between debt structure and future financing
and investment for firms with negative profitability against firms with zero or positive
profitability. Unlike in the high- vs low-growth subsamples, the differential impact of
total leverage is less pronounced. All else equal, negative profitability firms should
benefit more from reducing leverage, as they are closer to financial distress. However,
the coefficient magnitudes for negative profitability firms are essentially the same
compared to positive profitability firms.
Finally, Table 10 shows results for the subsample of constrained vs unconstrained
firms, where constrained firms are defined as having a value of SA greater than the
median. Again, there are no meaningful differences in the signs or magnitudes of the
coefficients for the two types of firms.
Overall, the analysis of these three subsamples of firms is broadly consistent with
the full sample analysis. Although the coefficients for total leverage and maturity
differ slightly across subsamples of firms, they are qualitatively the same. Therefore,
it is unlikely that particular subsets of firms are driving the average relation observed
in Table 4.
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5.2 Causality and Selection
My empirical strategy does not allow me to cleanly estimate a causal effect of debt
structure. There are two potential sources of endogeneity that may bias my regression
coefficients and lead me to overstate the true causal effect. First, there is reverse
causality, which would arise if firms select into a particular debt structure ex-ante
based on their expectations about the need to fund investment with external financing
in the future. If, for example, firms anticipate profitable investment opportunities in
the future, they may choose a particular level of debt and/or maturity profile that
will allow them to undertake the investment. Second, there is correlation with a
common, unobservable factor. This would arise if both debt structure and financing
and investment are correlated with a common variable that is not included as a control
in my regression.
In the following subsection, I address both potential sources of endogeneity by
modifying my empirical methodology and by implementing an econometric test for
the presence of selection on unobservables.
5.2.1 Reverse Causality
Despite the potential for reverse causality bias, it is difficult to believe that firms can
anticipate investment, and hence the need for financing, so far in advance. Therefore,
it is unlikely that the coefficients in Table 4 are primarily the result of firms selecting
ex-ante into debt structure based on expectations about future investment.
Consistent with this conjecture, my results remain significant when I separate the
sample by ex-ante measures of growth options, as I discuss in Chapter 5.1.1. Table
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8 illustrates that the relation between total debt and investment and between the
measure of short-maturity debt and investment is negative and significant for both
high- and low-growth firms. Were the coefficients being driven primarily by reverse
causality, I would not expect the relation to remain negative and significant in the
sample of low-growth firms. This is because such firms should have less incentive
to select ex-ante into a debt structure that allows them to undertake profitable
investments in the future.
As an additional robustness check for reverse causality in the investment equation,
I follow Lang, Ofek, and Stulz 1996 and Aivazian, Ge, and Qui 2005 and separate my
sample into core and noncore business segments. Lang, Ofek, and Stulz 1996 study
the effect of total debt on investment. In order to account for the possibility that
firms select low leverage anticipating profitable growth opportunities, they estimate
the relation between leverage and investment in diversified firms’ core and noncore
segments. They argue that the growth opportunities of divisions of a firm that are
removed from the core of the firm should not have much impact on capital structure.
Therefore, if leverage is related to investment primarily due to ex-ante selection, then
the relation should be much stronger for core divisions. On the other hand, if there is a
causal relation between leverage and investment, then there should be little difference
in the relation between leverage and investment across core and noncore segments.
Following the logic in Lang, Ofek, and Stulz 1996, if the coefficient estimates in
column 9 of Table 4 are primarily the result of firms selecting into a particular debt
structure anticipating investment opportunities, then they should be much stronger for
firms’ core segments. On the other hand, if the estimates pick up a causal effect of debt
structure, then they should be qualitatively similar in the noncore segments, because
the reverse causality concerns are mitigated in the sample of noncore segments.
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I identify firms’ core and noncore segments using the Compustat segments data.
I consider a core segment to be one with a two-digit SIC code that matches the
two-digit SIC code of the firm. The full dataset contains 116,873 core and 33,195
noncore segment-years. Following Lang, Ofek, and Stulz 1996, I measure segment-
level investment in two ways. First, I divide segment-level capital expenditures by
segment-level total assets (Compustat item capxs divided by item ias) and call this
measure Inv_seg1. Second, I subtract segment-level depreciation (Compustat item
dps) from capital expenditures and divide by segment-level total assets, and I call this
measure Inv_seg2.
I regress both measures of segment-level investment on the debt structure variables
and controls from equation 3.1. I use firm-level, as opposed to segment-level, controls
because most of the controls are only observable at the firm level. Table 11 reports the
results. Total debt and the measure of short-maturity debt are negative and significant
for both core and noncore investment as measured by either Inv_seg1 (columns 1-2)
or Inv_seg2 (columns 3-4). The magnitude of total debt is qualitatively similar across
types, and the short-maturity coefficient is actually stronger for noncore segments.
This indicates that a higher level of debt and a greater reliance on short-maturity
debt are negatively related to both core and noncore investment, the latter of which
should be less sensitive to growth opportunities. Therefore, it is unlikely that the
relation between total debt and maturity and investment is driven primarily by ex-ante
selection.
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5.2.2 Selection on Unobservables
I address the second potential source of endogeneity by testing how sensitive
the debt structure coefficient estimates are to omitted variables. I implement the
econometric test outlined in Oster 2015,25 which tests whether the inclusion of
additional unobservable variables could drive the cross-sectional relation between
debt structure and financing and investment to zero (i.e., produce a β statistically
indistinguishable from 0). As described in Dietrichson and Ellegard 2015, the Oster
2015 paper shows that if the relation between the variables of interest and the control
variables included in the estimation is proportional to the relation between the variables
of interest and the omitted variables (proportional selection), then the magnitudes of
changes in the coefficients of interest and the R2 after including controls are informative
about the size of the omitted variable bias.26
Oster 2015 suggests reporting the value of δ for a maximum R2 (“R2max”) of 1.3 ∗ R˜,
where R˜ is the fully-controlled R2.27 Conceptually, δ represents the degree of selection
on unobservable characteristics relative to observables that would be required to
explain away a result (i.e., drive the coefficient estimate to zero). For example, a
δ value of 2 means that unobservables would have to be twice as important as the
observables to produce a coefficient estimate equal to 0 were the unobservables to be
included in the regression. Thus, a value of δ greater than 1 means that unobservables
25I use the State module “psacalc.”
26A number of recent papers have implemented this test to understand how sensitive the main
results are to omitted variables. See, e.g., Dietrichson and Ellegard 2015, Galletta 2015, and Graham,
Miller, and Strom 2016.
27For further details and formal derivation of δ, see Oster 2015.
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would have to be more important than observables to produce a coefficient estimate
of 0, and Oster 2015 suggests showing a δ greater than 1 as a “robustness reporting
standard.”
Table 12 reports the values of δ for each of the debt structure variables for the
specifications that use total new financing, total net financing, investment, and
LPID/LPIE as the dependent variables. I use the estimated R2 from each specification
as R˜ (the fully-controlled R2). In other words, I take the R2s reported in Table 4,
multiply them by 1.3, and use those values as the value of R2max in the Oster 2015
test.
Overall, the results of the test do not indicate omitted variables are driving the
main results. For most specifications, the the values of δ for the debt structure variables
either exceed 1 or are negative. Values of δ that exceed 1 indicate that unobservables
would have to be more important than observables to produce a coefficient estimate
equal to 0. For example, the δ of 4.21 for total debt in the investment equation (row 1
of column 3) indicates that unobservables would have to be 4.21 times as important
as observables in order to drive the observed coefficient to 0 were they to be included.
Values of δ that are negative indicate that the coefficient increases in magnitude
when controls are added. For example, the δ of -4.57 for Short −maturity in the
investment equation indicates that the coefficient on Short −maturity is larger in
magnitude when the full set of controls is included compared to the coefficient when
only Short − maturity is included on the right-hand side. Although negative δs
make this method uninformative about the size of the potential omitted variable bias,
Graham, Miller, and Strom 2016 argue that negative deltas indicate that results are
unlikely to be driven by omitted variables. This is because going from zero controls to
the full set of controls strengthens the coefficients of interest when delta is negative.
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Overall, these results suggest that selection on unobservables is unlikely to be
driving the main results for the total level of debt and maturity. When the δs are
positive, they are mainly greater than 1, indicating that if the unobservables were
to be included in the regressions, the estimated coefficients would not be driven to
0. Additionally, negative values of δ indicate that inclusion of controls strengthens
the estimated coefficients, making it unlikely that including additional unobservables
would drive the coefficients to 0.
5.2.3 Discussion
Although the results of the dynamic panel estimation in Table 7 and the results
in Tables 8, 11, and 12 reduce concerns about reverse causality and endogeneity
more generally, I am ultimately unable to rule out reverse causality. However, three
additional points should be noted. First, the existence of reverse causality would
support a causal channel—firms should not select into, e.g., short-maturity debt unless
they believe short-maturity debt will cause future debt overhang to be less severe.
Second, although sparse, existing literature that uses exogenous changes in aspects
of debt structure generally agree with my results. While there is no paper, to my
knowledge, that identifies exogenous changes in the proportion of short-maturity
debt, existing literature does suggest that greater reliance on short-term debt can
have a causal effect on investment during times of heightened rollover risk. Almeida
et al. 2011 show that firms with more of their long-term debt maturing during the
onset of the financial crisis cut investment more than otherwise similar firms whose
debt was not maturing until later. In other words, firms that rely more heavily on
short-maturity debt may be less able to invest during times when it is difficult to
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roll over or refinance existing debt. This is broadly consistent with my results for
maturity, despite the fact that their findings are limited to a small time period and
do not exploit changes in reliance on short-maturity debt.
In terms of total leverage, Cohen, Katz, and Sadka 2016 show that firms increase
their total debt in response to an exogenous increase in debt capacity. That is, higher
debt capacity is associated with an increase in total debt. Although their results do
not indicate that firms increase investment following an increase in debt capacity, their
particular sample period (2007-2009) makes it difficult to draw a broad conclusion.
Thus, their findings are not inconsistent with my results and support that lower total
debt (high debt capacity) increases future external financing. Finally, in terms of
unsecured debt, Biguri 2016 shows that exogenous increases in access to unsecured
debt lead to greater investment. The relation between unsecured debt and investment
that I document is negative, but statistically insignificant, therefore my results are
not inconsistent with this finding.
Third, and most importantly, the results on maturity in particular are informative
regardless of the extent to which ex-ante selection of debt structure drives the results.
If reverse causality is the primary driver, then my results suggest firms select into
longer-maturity debt in anticipation of the need for financing and investment. This
would run contrary to the existing empirical evidence which concludes that firms
select short-maturity debt in order to mitigate future underinvestment incentives.
On the other hand, if the regression coefficients primarily pick up a causal effect of
debt structure, then my results suggest that short-maturity debt does not actually
increase future financing capacity or mitigate debt overhang, which contrasts with
many theoretical predictions.
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5.3 Cost of External Financing
The main results consider only the quantity of debt and equity, but the price of
debt and equity can also provide insight into how debt structure is related to the
ability of firms to access new financing. Therefore, as a robustness check, I estimate
the relation between debt structure and the cost of future financing.
I measure the cost of debt financing in two ways. First, I follow Maehlmann
2009 and use the realized cost of debt (realcost), measured as the ratio of a firm’s
interest expense in year t to interest-bearing debt outstanding in year t. Although
this is not a market-based measure, it still directly measures the cost of debt a firm
faces. Additionally, it is the only measure available from Compustat for firms without
publicly-traded debt.
Second, I measure the cost of publicly-offered debt using the Mergent FISD data.
In particular, I measure the weighted average offering yield for all of a firm’s bonds in
the year of issue, where the weights are based on the offering amount. I then compute
the difference between the weighted average yield and the yield of comparable-maturity
Treasuries and call this measure spread. This variable therefore measures the cost at
issue of a firm’s publicly-traded debt.
For the cost of equity, I compute the PEG ratio derived in Easton 2004. This
is the price-earnings ratio scaled by the short-term earnings growth rate and is a
commonly used heuristic measure of the cost of equity.28 Although there are many
other potential measures, such as the implied cost of equity in Gebhardt, Lee, and
Swaminathan 2005, the analysis in Botosan and Plumlee 2005 suggests that the PEG
ratio is one of the most consistently related to firm-specific risk.
28See Easton 2004 for an in-depth derivation and discussion.
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Following Easton 2004, I compute the PEG ratio as follows:
pegi,0 =
√
epsi,2 − epsi,1
pi,0
where epsi,t is firm i’s median long-run earnings-per-share forecast for year t and p0 is
the stock price at year 0. The data for EPS forecasts comes from I/B/E/S and the
stock prices from Compustat.
Summary statistics for the realcost, spread, and peg are found in Table 2. In
order to estimate the relation between debt structure and cost of debt, I estimate
equation 3.1 using realcost, spread, and peg as dependent variables, and I report the
results in Table 13. Total debt is positively related to the balance sheet (realized) cost
of debt, the offering spread, and the cost of equity. This is consistent with a higher
level of debt being associated with a lower quantity of total net financing as shown in
Table 4.
The measure of short-maturity debt is positively related to all three costs of
financing. Although the positive relation with the realized cost of debt is consistent
with the negative relation between Short−maturity and the quantity of total net
financing in Table 4, the fact that Short−maturity is positively related to the offering
spread is puzzling. This is because Short − maturity is associated with a greater
quantity of new debt financing, and the offering spread is essentially the cost of new
public debt issues. The fact that the quantity of debt in column 1 of Table 4 includes
all debt, and not just public debt, may explain this. The measure of unsecured debt
is not significantly related to the cost of either new debt or equity financing.
Overall, the results for the cost of debt and equity in Table 13 are broadly consistent
with the results for the quantity of debt and equity. A higher level of debt and a
greater reliance on short-maturity debt are associated with a lower quantity of future
external financing, and also a higher cost.
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Chapter 6
EXTENSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The following chapter details future work. In particular, there are two main
avenues through which the paper can be improved: better addressing endogeneity,
and adding additional aspects of debt structure.
6.1 Approaches to Endogeneity
There are few empirical papers that offer convincing sources of exogenous variation
in all aspects of debt structure. Cohen, Katz, and Sadka 2016 use exogenous variation
in total leverage, but not in any other aspects of debt. Almeida et al. 2011 use
exogenously determined maturity structure to study how maturity affects investment,
but their study only exploits cross-sectional heterogeneity in maturity at a given time,
rather than within firm variation over time. Additionally, they only consider maturity.
Similarly, Biguri 2016 uses exogenous variation in the amount of unsecured debt, but
does not consider maturity or priority.
An ideal test of causality in my paper would require a source of exogenous variation
in all aspects of debt structure at the same time. I.e., variation in total debt and
maturity and security and priority. As a second-best alternative, I take the following
approach: I try to identify firms with “suboptimal” debt structures and estimate the
relation to financing and investment. This directly addresses reverse causality because
firms should never select a suboptimal debt structure if they anticipate financing or
investment needs. If the only reason I observe a relation between debt structure and
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future firm outcomes is because firms with investment opportunities select ex-ante
into a particular debt structure, then the relation should weaken or disappear for
firms with suboptimal debt structure. Thus, if the relation between debt structure
and financing and investment is similar across firms with more and less optimal debt
structures, it must be that debt structure has a causal effect.
This approach requires that points at which debt structure is suboptimal be
identified. One way to do this is to identify firms that undertake significant refinancing
activity in order to change their capital structure. Assuming that such refinancing is
motivated by a desire to move the firm closer to the “optimal” debt structure, these
actions can provide a good setting for estimating a causal effect of debt structure.
This is because taking action to move capital structure close to the optimal level
implies that it was suboptimal in the years immediately preceding the refinancing.
Once firm-years in which debt structure is likely to be suboptimal are identified, I
can estimate the relation with financing and investment and compare the strength of
the association with that of the association between “more optimal” debt structure
and financing and investment. As an example of how this would work, consider a
firm for which I can identify refinancings that were motivated by a desire to change
capital structure at time t = 0 and t = 8. Because the firm refinanced at t = 8, its
debt structure was likely suboptimal at, e.g., t = 6. Now assume the firm undertakes
some financing and investment activity at t = 7 (before the major refinancing). The
relation between the suboptimal debt structure at t = 6 and the outcomes at t = 7
should be relatively more causal in nature than the relation between debt structure
and firm outcomes in general (i.e., for the rest of the sample).
The key hurdle to implementing such an approach empirically is identifying
major refinancings that are undertaken for capital structure reasons. First, deliberate
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refinancings, as opposed to, e.g., convertible debt conversions or exercises of employee
stock options, must be identified. As Korteweg, Schwert, and Strebulaev 2014 point
out, this is not trivial. Second, once deliberate refinancings are identified, the subset
of those that are used for capital structure reasons, as opposed to, e.g., investment or
operating reasons, must be identified.
One approach to identifying capital structure-motivated refinancings is outlined in
Korteweg, Schwert, and Strebulaev 2014. They use firms’ SEC filings to identify and
classify major refinancings into those used for (1) operating reasons, (2) investment
reasons, and (3) “capital structure” reasons. The capital structure refinancings include
equity repurchases, debt repayment or maturing debt, forced conversion of debt into
equity, restructuring/reorganization, and “pure capital structure” reasons. It may
be possible to use their methodology to capture when a firm moves closer to its
optimal debt structure. However, their method requires intensive hand collection
of data from firm SEC filings. Thus, as a first pass at identifying capital structure
motivated refinancings that requires less intensive data collection, I take the approach
of Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 2001, Hovakimian 2004, and Leary and Roberts
2005. These papers consider a capital structure change as having occurred if the
absolute value of the difference between the change in net equity and the change in net
debt scaled by the previous period total assets exceeds 5%. Borrowing the notation of
Korteweg, Schwert, and Strebulaev 2014, this means:
|∆Ei,q −∆Di,q|
Ai,q−1
> 0.05
Here, the variables are measured at the quarterly level, and net equity and net debt
are defined differently than in Chapter 3.1. Specifically, net equity is measured as
the sale of common and preferred stock minus the purchase of common and preferred
stock during quarter q, and net debt is the change in total debt (total debt being
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equal to the sum of short-term debt and long-term debt) from the previous quarter.
Quarterly total assets Ai,q is measured in the same way as in Chapter 3.1.
I construct a dummy equal to 1 if the condition above is met and 0 otherwise and
call this variable Refi. Thus, Refii,q is equal to 1 if firm i in quarter q undertook
a refinancing as defined above, and 0 otherwise. I include only firms for which I
have eight consecutive years of data in order to ensure that I have enough time
between refinancing events to conduct the analysis.29 After this filter, roughly 19% of
firm-quarters in the full sample are identified as refinancings, which is consistent with
both Leary and Roberts 2005 and Korteweg, Schwert, and Strebulaev 2014.
In order to identify suboptimal debt structure, I take the following approach. I first
require that each firm have (1) 8 consecutive years of data, (2) at least 2 refinancings
within the time period in which they appear in the data, and (3) at least one stretch of
6 or more years in which no refinancings occur. In other words, a sufficient condition
for a firm to be included is that it appear for 8 consecutive years and have a refinancing
in both the first and last year in which it appears in the data. Such a situation is
illustrated graphically in Figure 1: refinancings occur at t = 0 and t = 8, and no
refinancings occur in between. For firms with more than two refinancings during the
time in which they appear in the data, I require at least 6 years with no refinancings
between each refinancing firm-year.
After filtering the sample based on these criteria, I then code a firm-year as
“suboptimal” debt structure if it appears 6 or more years after one refinancing but two
or more years prior to another refinancing. Finally, I regress investment and financing
decisions that occur in between refinancings but after the “suboptimal” debt structure
firm-year on debt structure in the suboptimal firm-year.
29Because this cutoff is arbitrary, I conduct robustness checks using different cutoffs.
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This method is illustrated graphically in Figure 1. The firm has two refinancings,
at t = 0 and t = 8, and there are no other refinancings in between. I code firm-year
t = 6 as having suboptimal debt structure because it appears 7 years after the first
refinancing but two years prior to the second refinancing. I then measure investment
and financing at t = 7, which is in between the two refinancings but in the year after
the suboptimal debt structure firm-year. I regress the financing and investment at
t = 7 on debt structure at t = 6.
As described above, I estimate equation 3.1 for the subsample of firm-years in
which I can identify suboptimal debt structure. I then estimate 3.1 on the subsample
of firm-years for which debt structure is not suboptimal. I report the results of both
subsample estimations in Table 14. Similar to the subsample analysis in Chapter 5.1,
I only report results for the measures of total financing and investment. Columns
1-3 show how suboptimal debt structure is related to financing and investment, and
columns 4-6 show how debt structure that should be closer to optimal is related. The
measures of total leverage and short-maturity debt are significant (and their signs
unchanged relative to the main sample results) for both measures of total financing,
indicating that even when these characteristics of debt may be less than optimal, they
are still related to future financing. Although short-maturity debt loses significance
for investment, it is still negative.30
Although the coefficients in columns 1-3 are somewhat smaller in magnitude, they
are, for the most part, unchanged in sign and significance relative to columns 4-6. Thus,
Table 14 provides at least suggestive evidence that suboptimal debt characteristics are
30The requirements that (1) I have 8 consecutive years of data for each firm and (2) that I
require 6 or more years of no refinancings prior to when debt structure is measured decrease the
estimation sample, and thus the power, significantly. After applying these filters, the number of
useable observations drops to 83,078. Of this, there are 5,415 firm-years in which debt structure is
“suboptimal.”
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related to future financing and investment, which would indicate a causal effect because
reverse causality concerns are mitigated. A more precise measure of refinancings along
the lines of what Korteweg, Schwert, and Strebulaev 2014 describe may make the
results stronger. Therefore, I believe that further work in this direction is a promising
avenue for establishing causality.
6.2 Other Aspects of Debt
In addition to better addressing endogeneity, the results can be improved by adding
two additional aspects of debt structure that should affect financing and investment,
but for which the causal effect is empirically unclear.
6.2.1 Convertible Debt
The first aspect of debt that should affect financing and investment is the presence
of convertibility features. Convertible debt can be converted into equity by bondholders,
and it should theoretically affect financing and investment through its effect on agency
costs of debt.
Green 1984 shows that firms may issue convertible debt to mitigate asset sub-
stitution. This is possible because convertibility reduces how convex the payoff to
shareholders is in the value of the firm’s assets, thus reducing their incentive to shift
into higher-risk projects.31 Hennessy and Tserlukevich 2008 also show that convertible
31When convertibility is not present, shareholders can transfer value from bondholders by risk
shifting. However, convertibility forces existing shareholders to share the benefits of a riskier project
with new shareholders when conversion occurs.
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debt can mitigate risk-shifting. In contrast, Lyandres and Zhdanov 2014 show that
convertible debt can mitigate or even eliminate underinvestment incentives.32
As with maturity, security, and priority, the theory thus offers potentially conflicting
predictions. If convertibility reduces risk-shifting, then we might expect the presence
of conversion options to be associated with less financing and investment ex-post, as
growth options are not exercised as often. On the other hand, if these clauses reduce
underinvestment, then we would expect greater financing and investment ex-post.
Thus, the effect can go two ways depending on which theory we consider.
And as with maturity, security, and priority, the existing empirical literature
focuses primarily on the ex-ante question: how does the choice of whether to issue
convertible debt vary with expectations about investment opportunities or with
expectations about the severity of asset substitution? Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward
1998 show that firms that face more severe risk-shifting issue convertible debt with
higher post-conversion ownership.33 Similarly, Dorion et al. 2014 find that firms with
greater ex-ante risk-shifting incentives tend to issue more convertible debt.34
As for convertibility and underinvestment, Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward 1999 and
Krishnaswami and Yaman 2008 both find that higher market-to-book ratio predicts a
32Their model considers two opposing ways in which convertibility can affect investment incentives.
On the one hand, the debt-like features of convertible debt lead to underinvestment. On the other
hand, the convertibility can lead equityholders to invest earlier than they would with only straight
debt, which essentially lowers the value of the convertibility option to bondholders and leads to them
converting later. Delayed conversion in turn reduces the proportion of the total equity value the
bondholers capture, which reduces the transfer of wealth to bondholders from the investment and
mitigates underinvestment.
33Higher post-conversion ownership by debtholders means that equityholders are punished more if
debtholders choose to convert.
34Interestingly, they do not find a significant relation between market-to-book (a proxy for the
cost of underinvestment) and the probability of issuing convertible debt. Related to my study, they
also estimate the relation between convertibility and realized investment in risky projects.
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higher probability of issuing convertible debt as opposed to straight debt. This implies
that firms that expect underinvestment issue more convertible debt.
The existing empirical results may be interpreted as consistent with the predic-
tions of both Green 1984 and Hennessy and Tserlukevich 2008 as well as Lyandres
and Zhdanov 2014. That is, firms may expect that convertible debt reduces both
over- and under-investment. However, because the existing empirical results do not
relate convertibility to realized financing and investment, they cannot say whether
convertibility is able to reduce over- or under-investment ex-post.
Given the lack of empirical evidence on how the presence of convertibility provisions
affects financing and investment ex-post, my first extension will be to incorporate this
into the analysis. The sign of the coefficient on convertible debt will shed light on
which of the effects (over- or underinvestment) is remedied by convertible debt ex-post.
That is, if convertible debt is more important, on average, for underinvestment, then
we would expect a positive association with future financing and investment.
As a first pass, I gather data on convertibility from S&P Capital IQ and Mergent
FISD. For each firm-year, I construct the proportion of total debt outstanding that has
a convertibility provision. I use the Mergent FISD bond type “CCOV” to construct this
variable from the offering amount and amount outstanding in any given year. I add
the variable Conv to equation 3.1 and report the results in Table 15. The proportion
of convertible debt is positively and significantly related to net financing, investment,
and the probability of a LPID. This is consistent with the prediction of Lyandres
and Zhdanov 2014 that convertibility features should reduce future underinvestment
incentives.
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6.2.2 Performance Sensitive Debt
The second characteristic of debt that I will incorporate into my analysis is
performance pricing provisions. These are debt contract clauses that make debt
sensitive to firm performance. These clauses typically take the form of a rating
or financial ratio trigger that results in, e.g., an increase in coupon rate, a forced
early repayment of debt by equityholders, or a forced early repayment of debt with
proceeds from liquidation of the firm’s assets. The existing literature suggests that such
performance sensitive debt (PSD) can affect financing and investment by mitigating
agency costs.
The model of Bhanot and Mello 2006 suggest that credit rating based triggers
can reduce equityholders’ incentives to overinvest by shifting into riskier projects.
However, they show that this only occurs if the trigger is tied to a cash infusion by
equityholders, as opposed to, e.g., an increase in the coupon rate. In contrast, Koziol
and Lawrenz 2010 find that triggers tied to increases in coupon rate (in so-called
step-up bonds) can effectively mitigate overinvestment incentives.
Sarkar and Zhang 2015 also focus on PSD and agency costs, but instead look at
how performance provisions can affect underinvestment. They consider a setting in
which the coupon payment rises as performance deteriorates and default risk increases,
but in which the coupon payment falls as performance improves. The symmetric
nature of the performance trigger can result in coupon-based PSD reducing the effects
of debt overhang.35 Myklebust 2012 considers the joint choice of performance pricing
35This is because when equityholders invest in a positive NPV project, earnings of the firm increase,
which reduces default risk and results in a coupon decrease. The lower coupon payment makes
existing risky debtholders worse off at the expense of equityholders, mitigating the underinvestment
incentive ex-ante.
55
provisions and debt priority and finds that the impact of PSD on agency costs of debt
should depend on the priority structure of debt.36
Thus, the existing theoretical literature on how PSD affects agency costs offers
mixed implications for financing and investment. On the one hand, if PSD mitigates
risk-shifting incentives, then the use of PSD might be associated with less investment
ex-post. On the other hand, if PSD mitigates the effects of debt overhang, then we
might expect it to be associated with more debt and equity financing (because growth
options are exercised and funded with both debt and equity more often), as well as
investment, ex-post.
The empirical results on the relation between performance pricing provisions and
financing and investment are limited. The only paper, to my knowledge, that looks at
the relation between PSD and future financing is Begley 2012, which uses a sample
of loans from Dealscan and finds that firms that use PSD provisions receive more
private debt financing at a lower cost than those that do not. I am currently still in
the process of gathering data for PSD provisions.
36Consistent with Hackbarth and Mauer 2012, this model shows that if the firm has outstanding
risky debt, then issuing new debt of equal or higher priority reduces underinvestment but increases
risk-shifting, whereas issuing new debt of lower priority achieves the opposite. In the former case, if
the new debt also contains PSD provisions, then the risk-shifting problem is exacerbated. On the other
hand, if the firm issues new debt of lower priority with a PSD provision, then the underinvestment
problem is not as severe.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
I study the link between current debt structure and future financing and investment.
My results suggest that, contrary to existing empirical work and many theoretical
predictions, a greater proportion of short-maturity debt is associated with lower
ex-post financing and investment. This is consistent with short-term debt creating
rollover risk that can effectively reduce ex-ante debt capacity. The result is not driven
by the presence of call options in long-term debt, nor is it driven by an association
between bank debt and financing and investment. Additionally, the results show that
a higher total level of debt may reduce future external financing and investment. The
negative relation is not simply the result of rebalancing, nor is it due to a mechanical
feedback effect from growth options to leverage. Furthermore, I do not find that
total debt negatively impacts future investment primarily via an agency cost channel,
whereby higher debt imposes greater debt overhang. I conclude that the effect is
primarily a result of higher leverage reducing future debt capacity. Finally, I find
evidence that unsecured debt increases future debt issuance, but has an ambiguous
effect on future investment.
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Figure 1. Identifying Suboptimal Debt Structure Between Refinancings
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Table 2. Summary Statistics
Data is for nonfinancial, nonutility North American Compustat firms from 1978-2015. I
require that each firm-year have greater than $10 million in assets in order to be included in
the sample, and I exclude observations that are missing any of the explanatory variables
required for my primary tests. All variables are defined in Table 1. All variables are
winsorized at the 1% level.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Book_lev 150427 0.266 0.246 0 1
Mkt_lev 133099 0.257 0.255 0 0.94
Unsecured 112588 0.624 0.374 0 1
Short-maturity 132494 0.343 0.333 0 1
Subordinated 130963 0.049 0.152 0 0.828
LPID 128609 0.099 0.299 0 1
LPIE 150369 0.08 0.271 0 1
dissue 144168 0.098 0.183 0 1
eissue 146705 0.067 0.175 0 0.974
ndissue 127622 0.025 0.146 -0.295 0.832
neissue 124646 0.061 0.252 -0.161 1.75
newexternal 128310 0.226 0.459 0 2.837
netexternal 117750 0.092 0.323 -0.239 2.097
investment 148218 0.068 0.076 0 0.508
size 151037 5.223 1.9 2.303 10.461
mtb 128028 1.833 1.727 0.46 47.219
profitability 150089 0.076 0.205 -4.72 0.432
tangibility 150742 0.299 0.237 0 0.945
dividend payer 151037 0.387 0.487 0 1
rd 150068 0.04 0.1 0 0.69
missrd 150068 0.45 0.5 0 1
cash 140174 0.111 0.157 0 0.893
apay 150952 0.091 0.079 0.003 0.426
rtg_dummy 151037 0.196 0.397 0 1
salegr 134190 1.203 0.618 0.283 5.369
SA 150427 -2.934 0.684 -4.713 -1.475
age 150427 9.572 8.272 0 37
realcost 127351 0.122 0.149 0.007 1
spread 5537 1.706 3.28 -10.72 9.07
peg 31943 0.148 0.167 0 1.179
inv_seg1 79398 0.071 0.087 0 0.504
inv_seg2 78351 0.022 0.079 -0.162 0.416
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Table 5. Financing and Investment: Effective Maturity
Results of estimating linear regressions of total new external financing (newexternal,
column 1), total net external financing (netexternal, column 2), investment (investment,
column 3), LPID, and LPIE on debt characteristics and controls. All right-hand side
variables are one-period lagged levels. Data is for nonfinancial, nonutility North American
Compustat firms from 1978-2015. I require that each firm-year have greater than $10 million
in assets in order to be included in the sample, and I exclude observations that are missing
any of the explanatory variables required for my primary tests. All variables are defined in
Table 1. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Total new Total net Inv LPID LPIE
Book_lev 0.059*** -0.13*** -0.037*** -0.30*** -0.074***
(0.0093) (0.0061) (0.0022) (0.0061) (0.0058)
Short-Eff-Mat 0.012*** -0.020*** -0.0026*** -0.024*** 0.0048
(0.0034) (0.0021) (0.00075) (0.0039) (0.0035)
Unsecured -0.023*** 0.011*** -0.00028 0.0071** -0.0053
(0.0042) (0.0024) (0.00093) (0.0036) (0.0033)
Subord 0.016 0.012* 0.0038 -0.0013 0.0084
(0.011) (0.0060) (0.0026) (0.0082) (0.0079)
Size -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.0032*** -0.0088*** -0.011***
(0.0023) (0.0014) (0.00064) (0.0010) (0.00094)
MTB 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.0074*** 0.021*** 0.024***
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.00037) (0.0014) (0.0013)
Profitability -0.11*** -0.10*** 0.043*** 0.070*** 0.16***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.0029) (0.0098) (0.0099)
Tangibility 0.079*** 0.050*** 0.026*** 0.0052 -0.0087
(0.013) (0.0090) (0.0050) (0.0074) (0.0066)
Div payer 0.0059 0.013*** 0.00073 0.0061** 0.0013
(0.0036) (0.0020) (0.00092) (0.0029) (0.0027)
R&D 0.40*** 0.35*** 0.00019 -0.032 0.23***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.0060) (0.020) (0.022)
Miss R&D 0.0096 0.0045 0.0018 0.011*** 0.0028
(0.0059) (0.0034) (0.0014) (0.0032) (0.0028)
Cash -0.14*** -0.079*** 0.028*** -0.17*** 0.079***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.0031) (0.011) (0.012)
Trade credit 0.25*** 0.14*** 0.027*** 0.14*** 0.029*
(0.033) (0.018) (0.0074) (0.019) (0.017)
Rtg dum -0.025*** -0.0023 0.00093 -0.0040 0.00073
(0.0049) (0.0027) (0.0012) (0.0038) (0.0036)
Observations 73,902 67,502 78,023 77,990 78,983
R-squared 0.072 0.128 0.107 0.086 0.067
Firm & Yr FE Yes Yes Yes No No
Ind-Yr FE No No No Yes Yes
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Table 6. Financing and Investment: Bank Debt
Results of estimating linear regressions of total new external financing (newexternal,
column 1), total net external financing (netexternal, column 2), investment (investment,
column 3), LPID, and LPIE on debt characteristics and controls. All right-hand side
variables are one-period lagged levels. Data is for nonfinancial, nonutility North American
Compustat firms from 1978-2015. I require that each firm-year have greater than $10 million
in assets in order to be included in the sample, and I exclude observations that are missing
any of the explanatory variables required for my primary tests. All variables are defined in
Table 1. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Total new Total net Inv LPID LPIE
Book_lev 0.042*** -0.16*** -0.033*** -0.27*** -0.097***
(0.016) (0.011) (0.0038) (0.0089) (0.0095)
Short-Mat 0.027*** -0.019*** -0.0056*** -0.024*** 0.0063
(0.0049) (0.0033) (0.0011) (0.0057) (0.0058)
Bankdebt 0.014*** -0.0079** -0.0030*** 0.0036 -0.0019
(0.0053) (0.0034) (0.0011) (0.0054) (0.0056)
Unsecured -0.024*** 0.0081** -0.0019 0.0035 0.0013
(0.0065) (0.0038) (0.0012) (0.0055) (0.0055)
Subord 0.051*** 0.0093 -0.0057 0.0093 -0.0087
(0.018) (0.011) (0.0038) (0.013) (0.014)
Size -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.0032** -0.0054*** -0.012***
(0.0046) (0.0032) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0016)
MTB 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.0045*** 0.022*** 0.024***
(0.0023) (0.0020) (0.00052) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Profitability -0.13*** -0.14*** 0.027*** 0.029** 0.13***
(0.021) (0.017) (0.0037) (0.013) (0.016)
Tangibility 0.096*** 0.075*** -0.016* 0.018 -0.00079
(0.025) (0.018) (0.0097) (0.012) (0.011)
Div payer 0.0060 0.013*** 0.00056 0.0095** 0.00090
(0.0057) (0.0032) (0.0013) (0.0046) (0.0047)
R&D 0.43*** 0.40*** 0.0061 -0.019 0.17***
(0.055) (0.054) (0.0080) (0.028) (0.034)
Miss R&D -0.020 0.0035 -0.00087 0.011** -0.0017
(0.013) (0.0064) (0.0019) (0.0051) (0.0052)
Cash -0.12*** -0.090*** 0.018*** -0.13*** 0.070***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.0042) (0.016) (0.019)
Trade credit 0.13** 0.074* 0.021 0.061** 0.0038
(0.061) (0.041) (0.013) (0.030) (0.030)
Rtg dum -0.012 0.0022 0.0050** -0.015*** 0.0019
(0.0094) (0.0052) (0.0022) (0.0055) (0.0061)
Observations 26,618 24,251 28,114 28,201 28,276
R-squared 0.080 0.148 0.063 0.077 0.069
Firm & Yr FE Yes Yes Yes No No
Ind-Yr FE No No No Yes Yes
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Table 7. Financing and Investment: Dynamic Panel Results
Results of GMM estimation of equation 3.3, implemented using the Stata module xtabond.
Dependent variables are total new external financing (newexternal, column 1), total net
external financing (netexternal, column 2), and investment (investment, column 3). All
independent variables are lagged one period. Data is for nonfinancial, nonutility North
American Compustat firms, 1978-2015. I require that each firm-year have greater than $10
million in assets to be included, and I exclude observations that are missing any of the
explanatory variables required for my primary tests. All variables are defined in Table 1.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Tot new Tot net Inv
Book_lev -0.14*** -0.33*** -0.039***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.0037)
Short-mat 0.040*** -0.020*** -0.00071
(0.0043) (0.0030) (0.00099)
Unsecured 0.032*** 0.038*** -0.00029
(0.0052) (0.0038) (0.0013)
Subord 0.00011 0.0058 0.0024
(0.017) (0.011) (0.0032)
Size -0.14*** -0.17*** -0.0076***
(0.0053) (0.0046) (0.0015)
MTB 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.0029***
(0.0028) (0.0029) (0.00057)
Profitability 0.086*** 0.069*** 0.041***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.0054)
Tangibility 0.24*** 0.20*** -0.27***
(0.023) (0.019) (0.0098)
Div payer -0.014*** 0.0014 -0.0018*
(0.0046) (0.0031) (0.0011)
R&D 0.69*** 0.54*** 0.017*
(0.055) (0.055) (0.0097)
Miss R&D 0.014* 0.0034 -0.0012
(0.0085) (0.0059) (0.0020)
Cash -0.24*** -0.17*** 0.020***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.0040)
Trade credit 0.51*** 0.45*** -0.0048
(0.042) (0.035) (0.0095)
Rtg dum -0.077*** -0.012** -0.00076
(0.0077) (0.0051) (0.0017)
L.total_external 0.14***
(0.010)
L.net_external 0.045***
(0.0090)
L.investment 0.35***
(0.014)
Observations 52,722 45,675 59,505
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Table 8. High vs. Low Sales Growth Firms
Results of estimating linear regressions of total new external financing (newexternal), total
net external financing (netexternal), and investment (investment) on debt characteristics
and controls. The high-growth sample is defined as firm-years in which sales growth is above
the median, and the low-growth sample is firm-years in which sales growth is at or below the
median. All right-hand side variables are one-period lagged levels. Data is for nonfinancial,
nonutility North American Compustat firms from 1978-2015. I require that each firm-year
have greater than $10 million in assets in order to be included in the sample, and I exclude
observations that are missing any of the explanatory variables required for my primary tests.
All variables are defined in Table 1. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and ∗p < 0.1. Standard
errors clustered at the firm level.
High growth Low growth
Tot New Tot Net Inv Tot New Tot Net Inv
Book_lev 0.053*** -0.14*** -0.038*** 0.090*** -0.12*** -0.033***
(0.013) (0.0092) (0.0032) (0.013) (0.0083) (0.0027)
Short-mat 0.018*** -0.018*** -0.0052*** 0.028*** -0.024*** -0.0038***
(0.0052) (0.0035) (0.0013) (0.0051) (0.0029) (0.00096)
Unsecured -0.017*** 0.0072** 0.00030 -0.027*** 0.015*** -0.00052
(0.0054) (0.0035) (0.0013) (0.0059) (0.0032) (0.0011)
Subord 0.013 0.018** 0.00084 0.011 0.0083 0.0062*
(0.014) (0.0086) (0.0033) (0.017) (0.0085) (0.0032)
Size -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.0028*** -0.011*** -0.021*** -0.00100
(0.0029) (0.0021) (0.00091) (0.0036) (0.0020) (0.00081)
MTB 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.0070*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.0063***
(0.0017) (0.0016) (0.00048) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.00050)
Profitability -0.098*** -0.11*** 0.040*** -0.13*** -0.11*** 0.053***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.0040) (0.019) (0.015) (0.0040)
Tangibility 0.10*** 0.053*** 0.032*** 0.067*** 0.055*** 0.032***
(0.018) (0.013) (0.0073) (0.017) (0.012) (0.0057)
Div payer 0.0073 0.011*** 0.00029 0.00015 0.014*** 0.0012
(0.0051) (0.0031) (0.0013) (0.0047) (0.0025) (0.0011)
R&D 0.27*** 0.22*** -0.0061 0.44*** 0.41*** 0.018**
(0.045) (0.044) (0.0081) (0.055) (0.054) (0.0087)
Miss R&D 0.0097 -0.0050 0.0015 0.0051 0.0026 0.0020
(0.0080) (0.0052) (0.0022) (0.0075) (0.0041) (0.0016)
Cash -0.15*** -0.095*** 0.034*** -0.14*** -0.093*** 0.016***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.0043) (0.019) (0.015) (0.0041)
Trade credit 0.24*** 0.12*** 0.027*** 0.25*** 0.16*** 0.030***
(0.043) (0.027) (0.011) (0.043) (0.024) (0.0088)
Rtg dum -0.029*** -0.0064* 0.00036 -0.021*** 0.0023 0.0010
(0.0062) (0.0038) (0.0017) (0.0069) (0.0036) (0.0014)
Observations 35,820 32,249 37,497 37,533 34,797 39,970
R-squared 0.076 0.131 0.102 0.062 0.094 0.096
Firm-Yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 9. Negative vs. Nonnegative Profitability Firms
Results of estimating linear regressions of total new external financing (newexternal), total
net external financing (netexternal), and investment (investment) on debt characteristics
and controls. The negative profitability sample is defined as firm-years in which profitability
is less than 0, and the nonnegative profitability sample is firm-years in which profitability is
at or above 0. All right-hand side variables are one-period lagged levels. Data is for
nonfinancial, nonutility North American Compustat firms from 1978-2015. I require that
each firm-year have greater than $10 million in assets in order to be included in the sample,
and I exclude observations that are missing any of the explanatory variables required for my
primary tests. All variables are defined in Table 1. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and ∗p < 0.1.
Standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Negative profitability Nonnegative profitability
Tot New Tot Net Inv Tot New Tot Net Inv
Book_lev 0.034* -0.095*** -0.024*** 0.068*** -0.15*** -0.041***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.0050) (0.011) (0.0061) (0.0026)
Short-mat 0.0034 -0.024*** -0.0051** 0.025*** -0.022*** -0.0053***
(0.0091) (0.0083) (0.0022) (0.0040) (0.0021) (0.00089)
Unsecured -0.024** -0.0060 -0.0022 -0.020*** 0.013*** 0.00026
(0.010) (0.0095) (0.0024) (0.0046) (0.0023) (0.00099)
Subord 0.017 0.0025 0.010 0.015 0.0063 0.0025
(0.044) (0.030) (0.0078) (0.012) (0.0058) (0.0026)
Size -0.068*** -0.064*** 0.0011 -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.0039***
(0.0066) (0.0060) (0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0014) (0.00069)
MTB 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.0037*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.0089***
(0.0035) (0.0038) (0.00054) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.00056)
Profitability -0.15*** -0.12*** 0.018*** 0.020 -0.030** 0.073***
(0.031) (0.033) (0.0037) (0.020) (0.013) (0.0063)
Tangibility 0.080*** 0.089*** -0.021* 0.066*** 0.033*** 0.033***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.011) (0.015) (0.0091) (0.0053)
Div payer 0.00099 0.012 0.0013 0.0051 0.011*** 0.00011
(0.012) (0.011) (0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0019) (0.00097)
R&D 0.43*** 0.40*** -0.0059 -0.016 0.062* -0.017
(0.053) (0.057) (0.0074) (0.044) (0.034) (0.012)
Miss R&D -0.0012 -0.020 -0.0059 0.0051 0.0025 0.0014
(0.021) (0.016) (0.0053) (0.0061) (0.0032) (0.0015)
Cash -0.054** -0.037 0.027*** -0.21*** -0.11*** 0.022***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.0047) (0.014) (0.0099) (0.0042)
Trade credit 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.035** 0.27*** 0.12*** 0.025***
(0.066) (0.058) (0.016) (0.040) (0.018) (0.0083)
Rtg dum 0.012 0.018 0.011** -0.029*** -0.0053** 0.00086
(0.019) (0.019) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0027) (0.0012)
Observations 12,930 10,886 13,395 60,985 56,627 64,641
R-squared 0.192 0.210 0.068 0.040 0.097 0.124
Firm-Yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 10. Constrained vs. Unconstrained Firms
Results of estimating linear regressions of total new external financing (newexternal), total
net external financing (netexternal), and investment (investment) on debt characteristics
and controls. The constrained sample is defined as firm-years in which the variable SA is
above the median, and the unconstrained sample is firm-years in which SA is at or below
the median. SA is derived from Hadlock and Pierce 2010. All right-hand side variables are
one-period lagged levels. Data is for nonfinancial, nonutility North American Compustat
firms from 1978-2015. I require that each firm-year have greater than $10 million in assets in
order to be included in the sample, and I exclude observations that are missing any of the
explanatory variables required for my primary tests. All variables are defined in Table 1.
5∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Constrained Unconstrained
Tot New Tot Net Inv Tot New Tot Net Inv
Book_lev 0.044*** -0.14*** -0.040*** 0.064*** -0.14*** -0.033***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.0036) (0.013) (0.0076) (0.0029)
Short-mat 0.0065 -0.025*** -0.0041*** 0.030*** -0.024*** -0.0062***
(0.0056) (0.0042) (0.0013) (0.0046) (0.0025) (0.0010)
Unsecured -0.015** 0.012*** -0.0026* -0.017*** 0.012*** 0.0010
(0.0061) (0.0043) (0.0014) (0.0061) (0.0029) (0.0012)
Subord 0.0080 0.014 0.0027 0.0070 0.0088 -0.0017
(0.021) (0.014) (0.0057) (0.012) (0.0066) (0.0025)
Size -0.045*** -0.056*** -0.0030*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.0054***
(0.0047) (0.0033) (0.0011) (0.0037) (0.0020) (0.00092)
MTB 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.0067*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.0074***
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.00046) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.00061)
Profitability -0.090*** -0.074*** 0.026*** -0.041* -0.076*** 0.078***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.0031) (0.023) (0.016) (0.0061)
Tangibility 0.11*** 0.074*** -0.030*** 0.059*** 0.045*** 0.036***
(0.021) (0.016) (0.0080) (0.018) (0.011) (0.0069)
Div payer 0.0012 0.0090** 0.0043*** 0.0026 0.012*** -0.00041
(0.0056) (0.0036) (0.0015) (0.0048) (0.0024) (0.0011)
R&D 0.43*** 0.39*** -0.0011 0.30*** 0.32*** -0.016
(0.043) (0.045) (0.0069) (0.067) (0.058) (0.011)
Miss R&D 0.0027 -0.0011 0.0023 0.0043 0.0037 -0.00051
(0.0082) (0.0064) (0.0024) (0.0081) (0.0040) (0.0018)
Cash -0.097*** -0.072*** 0.026*** -0.21*** -0.11*** 0.024***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.0040) (0.019) (0.013) (0.0047)
Trade credit 0.25*** 0.16*** 0.016 0.25*** 0.11*** 0.046***
(0.038) (0.030) (0.0096) (0.062) (0.024) (0.011)
Rtg dum -0.062*** -0.016 -0.0049 -0.019*** -0.0052* 0.0029**
(0.017) (0.012) (0.0048) (0.0056) (0.0030) (0.0013)
Observations 34,249 30,960 35,633 39,666 36,553 42,403
R-squared 0.092 0.136 0.076 0.041 0.083 0.138
Firm-Yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 11. Segment-level Investment Regressions
Results of estimating linear regressions of two measures of segment-level investment on debt
characteristics and controls for core (columns 1 and 3) and noncore (columns 2 and 4)
segments. All right-hand side variables are one-period lagged levels. Data is for nonfinancial,
nonutility North American Compustat firms from 1978-2015. I require that each firm-year
have greater than $10 million in assets in order to be included in the sample, and I exclude
observations that are missing any of the explanatory variables required for my primary tests.
All variables are defined in Table 1. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and ∗p < 0.1. Standard
errors clustered at the firm level.
Inv_seg1 Inv_seg2
Core Noncore Core Noncore
Book_lev -0.044*** -0.032*** -0.055*** -0.033***
(0.0042) (0.0075) (0.0047) (0.0075)
Short-mat -0.0038** -0.0090*** -0.0075*** -0.011***
(0.0016) (0.0032) (0.0017) (0.0032)
Unsecured 0.0015 0.0063* -0.00019 0.0046
(0.0019) (0.0036) (0.0019) (0.0036)
Subord 0.0034 0.0025 0.0021 0.0017
(0.0045) (0.0072) (0.0049) (0.0068)
Size -0.0038*** -0.0016 -0.0050*** -0.0030
(0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0011) (0.0020)
MTB 0.0076*** 0.0058*** 0.011*** 0.0083***
(0.00076) (0.0017) (0.00083) (0.0017)
Profitability 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.047***
(0.0064) (0.012) (0.0074) (0.011)
Tangibility 0.0072 0.027** -0.052*** -0.027**
(0.0086) (0.014) (0.0080) (0.013)
Div payer 0.0017 -0.00059 0.0015 0.0013
(0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0018) (0.0029)
R&D 0.0088 0.053 -0.034** -0.0084
(0.013) (0.040) (0.015) (0.043)
Miss R&D 0.00025 -0.0011 -0.00056 0.0017
(0.0027) (0.0042) (0.0028) (0.0042)
Cash 0.019*** 0.027** 0.024*** 0.034***
(0.0068) (0.013) (0.0072) (0.013)
Trade credit 0.040*** 0.014 0.038*** 0.0093
(0.014) (0.020) (0.013) (0.018)
Rtg dum -0.0022 -0.0026 -0.0018 -0.0042
(0.0022) (0.0035) (0.0024) (0.0034)
Observations 28,970 14,207 28,660 13,922
R-squared 0.075 0.049 0.104 0.043
Firm & Yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 12. Test for Selection on Unobservables
Results of the Oster 2015 test for selection on unobservables, implemented using the Stata
module “psacalc.” The table reports the values of δ for each of the four debt structure
measures in the regression specifications that use newexternal, netexternal, investment,
LPID, and LPIE on the left-hand side. The values of R2max are computed by multiplying
the fully-controlled R2 from Table 4 by 1.3. See Oster 2015 for details on the derivation of δ.
A value of δ < 0 indicates that the coefficient increases in magnitude with the addition of
controls. Although this does not imply that the coefficient is unstable, it does mean this
method is uninformative about the size of the omitted variable bias.
Total new Total net Investment LPID LPIE
Book_lev 1.43 0.07 4.21 0.43 -0.35
Short-maturity 11.54 -3.75 -4.57 -1.43 0.49
Unsecured 2.82 -1.82 0.23 17.12 1.2
Subordinated 3.15 -0.75 -0.91 0.14 -0.46
R-squared max 0.09 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.09
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Table 13. Cost of External Financing
Results of estimating linear regressions of realized cost of debt (realcost), offer yield spread
over maturity-matched Treasuries (spread), and the price-earnings growth ratio (peg) on
debt characteristics and controls. All right-hand side variables are one-period lagged levels.
Data is for nonfinancial, nonutility North American Compustat firms from 1978-2015. I
require that each firm-year have greater than $10 million in assets in order to be included in
the sample, and I exclude observations that are missing any of the explanatory variables
required for my primary tests. All variables are defined in Table 1. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01,
∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Realcost Spread PEG ratio
Book_lev 0.015*** 1.92*** 0.13***
(0.0059) (0.56) (0.013)
Short-mat 0.031*** 0.70** 0.013***
(0.0028) (0.31) (0.0033)
Unsecured 0.016*** 0.22 0.0036
(0.0027) (0.37) (0.0041)
Subord 0.013*** 0.099 0.00089
(0.0050) (0.49) (0.013)
Size -0.0081*** -0.015 -0.0091***
(0.0016) (0.16) (0.0030)
MTB -0.0020* -0.41*** -0.020***
(0.0012) (0.096) (0.0021)
Profitability -0.040*** -0.88 -0.31***
(0.0093) (1.20) (0.028)
Tangibility -0.0037 -0.11 0.10***
(0.0088) (0.88) (0.017)
Div payer -0.0072*** 0.14 -0.0040
(0.0022) (0.28) (0.0042)
R&D 0.063** 6.89*** 0.051
(0.027) (2.47) (0.040)
Miss R&D -0.0075** -0.34 0.0082
(0.0035) (0.42) (0.0057)
Cash 0.0036 -0.97 -0.025
(0.011) (1.17) (0.017)
Trade credit 0.055*** 2.05 0.013
(0.019) (2.10) (0.037)
Rtg dum -0.0071*** -0.29 0.0033
(0.0027) (0.25) (0.0042)
Observations 73,308 2,890 20,742
R-squared 0.016 0.240 0.187
Firm-Yr FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 14. Suboptimal Debt Structure
Results of estimating linear regressions of total new external financing (newexternal), total
net external financing (netexternal), and investment (investment) on debt characteristics
and controls. The suboptimal debt structure sample is defined as firm-years in which debt
structure is suboptimal as described in Chapter 6.1, and the optimal debt structure sample
is firm-years in which debt structure is not suboptimal. All right-hand side variables are
one-period lagged levels. Data is for nonfinancial, nonutility North American Compustat
firms from 1978-2015. I require that each firm-year have greater than $10 million in assets in
order to be included in the sample, and I exclude observations that are missing any of the
explanatory variables required for my primary tests. All variables are defined in Table 1.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Suboptimal Optimal
Tot New Tot Net Inv Tot New Tot Net Inv
Book_lev 0.18*** -0.067*** -0.033*** 0.060*** -0.14*** -0.039***
(0.042) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0070) (0.0026)
Short-mat 0.015* -0.0085*** -0.0011 0.023*** -0.024*** -0.0052***
(0.0090) (0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0042) (0.0026) (0.00097)
Unsecured 0.019* 0.0020 0.0013 -0.027*** 0.0091*** -0.00076
(0.010) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0049) (0.0027) (0.0011)
Subord 0.019 -0.0010 -0.0014 0.023* 0.0082 0.0014
(0.038) (0.0089) (0.0074) (0.013) (0.0066) (0.0028)
Size -0.0030 -0.0062** -0.0067** -0.024*** -0.032*** -0.0025***
(0.0087) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0017) (0.00072)
MTB -0.0020 0.0027* 0.0052*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.0076***
(0.0039) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.00046)
Profitability 0.044 -0.023 0.071*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 0.044***
(0.051) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.0035)
Tangibility 0.070*** 0.028** 0.016 0.091*** 0.057*** 0.025***
(0.025) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.011) (0.0056)
Div payer -0.014 0.00040 0.0023 0.0074* 0.013*** 0.00077
(0.010) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0043) (0.0023) (0.0011)
R&D 0.23 -0.029 0.060 0.35*** 0.32*** 0.00050
(0.14) (0.041) (0.043) (0.041) (0.037) (0.0074)
Miss R&D -0.015 -0.0081* -0.0032 0.014** 0.0040 0.0019
(0.016) (0.0044) (0.0040) (0.0068) (0.0041) (0.0016)
Cash -0.071*** -0.043*** 0.015 -0.14*** -0.082*** 0.029***
(0.024) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.0039)
Trade credit 0.20** 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.25*** 0.15*** 0.030***
(0.082) (0.029) (0.028) (0.039) (0.022) (0.0091)
Rtg dum -0.0058 -0.00066 -0.00052 -0.033*** -0.0037 0.00077
(0.016) (0.0065) (0.0047) (0.0054) (0.0031) (0.0014)
Observations 4,891 4,702 5,068 51,513 48,641 54,060
R-squared 0.053 0.040 0.179 0.069 0.136 0.108
Firm-Yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 15. Financing and Investment: Convertible debt
Results of estimating linear regressions of total new external financing (newexternal,
column 1), total net external financing (netexternal, column 2), investment (investment,
column 5), LPID, and LPIE on debt characteristics and controls. All right-hand side
variables are one-period lagged levels. Data is for nonfinancial, nonutility North American
Compustat firms from 1978-2015. I require that each firm-year have greater than $10 million
in assets in order to be included in the sample, and I exclude observations that are missing
any of the explanatory variables required for my primary tests. All variables are defined in
Table 1. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, and ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Total new Total net LPID LPIE Inv
Book_lev 0.062*** -0.13*** -0.31*** -0.074*** -0.038***
(0.0093) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0058) (0.0023)
Short-mat 0.020*** -0.023*** -0.026*** 0.0040 -0.0054***
(0.0037) (0.0023) (0.0039) (0.0036) (0.00083)
Unsecured -0.022*** 0.0097*** 0.0060* -0.0052 -0.00062
(0.0042) (0.0024) (0.0036) (0.0033) (0.00093)
Subord 0.017 0.011* -0.0010 0.0088 0.0037
(0.011) (0.0060) (0.0082) (0.0079) (0.0026)
Conv -0.00037 0.016*** 0.023** 0.0029 0.0042***
(0.0068) (0.0058) (0.010) (0.0084) (0.0015)
Size -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.0089*** -0.011*** -0.0034***
(0.0023) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.00095) (0.00064)
MTB 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.0074***
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.00037)
Profitability -0.11*** -0.10*** 0.070*** 0.16*** 0.043***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.0097) (0.0099) (0.0029)
Tangibility 0.079*** 0.050*** 0.0056 -0.0086 0.026***
(0.013) (0.0090) (0.0074) (0.0066) (0.0050)
Div payer 0.0060* 0.013*** 0.0065** 0.0013 0.00074
(0.0036) (0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.00093)
R&D 0.40*** 0.36*** -0.030 0.23*** 0.00061
(0.036) (0.035) (0.020) (0.022) (0.0060)
Miss R&D 0.0097* 0.0047 0.011*** 0.0028 0.0018
(0.0059) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0014)
Cash -0.14*** -0.080*** -0.17*** 0.079*** 0.028***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.0031)
Trade credit 0.25*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.029* 0.027***
(0.033) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.0074)
Rtg dum -0.024*** -0.0036 -0.0052 0.00053 0.00058
(0.0049) (0.0027) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0012)
Observations 73,873 67,478 77,957 78,950 77,990
R-squared 0.073 0.129 0.086 0.067 0.108
Firm & Yr FE Yes Yes No No Yes
Ind-Yr FE No No Yes Yes No
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APPENDIX A
LARGE PROACTIVE INCREASES IN DEBT AND EQUITY
79
A.1 Identifying Large Proactive Increases in Debt
In order to identify large, proactive increases in debt (LPIDs), I utilize the following
method, which I derive from Denis and McKeon 2012.
First, I identify firm-years in which (1) total debt increased relative to the previous
year and (2) market leverage increased by more than 0.1 relative to the previous year.
That is, firm-years in which the year-over-year change in market leverage was greater
than 10 percentage points. Market leverage is equal to the book value of debt divided
by the sum of the book value of debt and market capitalization. Because market
leverage is bound between 0 and 1, this equates to an increase of 10 percentage points
or more. This is the way in which I define “large.”
Second, from that subset of observations, I further identify which increases in
leverage are predominantly a result of a large increase in debt, as opposed to an
exogenous decline in equity value. Here, I follow Denis and McKeon 2012 and define
a variable $∆MLit which captures the value of additional market leverage resulting
from the increase:
$∆MLit = Di,t −Di,t−1 MAit
MAi,t−1
(A.1)
where Dit is the total debt of firm i in year t and MAit is the sum of market value of
equity and book value of debt. In order to screen out increases in leverage that result
from declines in equity value, I require that the increase in total debt I observe is at
least 90% of $∆MLit. In other words, if total debt increases by 9, and $∆MLit = 10,
then I include it.
As an example of how this measure allows for the screening out of increases in
leverage that result from declines in equity value, assume the market value of assets
in year t− 1 is 100, and total debt is 20, meaning the firm’s market leverage is 0.20.
If the firm issues an additional 30 in debt in year t with no change in the value of
equity, its assets increase to 130, and its market leverage increases to 0.38. The value
of additional debt resulting from the increase, $∆MLit, is 24. Therefore, the increase
in total debt is 125% of $∆MLit, well in excess of the 90% threshold. Now assume
that, instead of issuing additional debt in year t, the firm keeps debt at 20, but the
market value of equity drops to 32.6 in year t. Assets therefore decrease to 52.63,
but leverage increases (due to the decrease in equity) to 0.38. So, we have the same
change in market leverage, except there has been no change in debt. In this case,
$∆MLit = 9.47. But since debt did not change, the 90% threshold is not met, so this
observation would be screened out.
This gives me a subset of large leverage increases that are primarily the result of a
firm taking on more debt. Finally, from this set of observations I select only those for
which I can identify, using the Statement of Cash Flows (SCF), that the funds from the
debt issuance were primarily associated with (1) an increase in long-term investment
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(capital expenditures or acquisitions), (2) engaging in a payout to shareholders or
repurchasing stock, (3) an increase in working capital, or (4) covering an operational
cash flow shortfall from, e.g., a negative earnings shock. In particular, following Denis
and McKeon 2012 I require that the combined uses of funds from the SCF comprise
at least 80% of the observed increase in debt. For example, if a firm’s debt increases
from $100 million in year t to $200 million in year t+ 1, the screen requires that data
on at least $80 million of the three potential uses of funds be available.
In addition to filtering the sample based on the SCF, I use the breakdown of the
use of funds to classify each LPID into a primary use of funds category. That is,
I categorize the LPIDs as primarily being used for long-term investment, payouts,
increases in working capital, covering operational cash shortfalls, or for “multiple” uses.
The primary use of funds is defined by whichever category comprises greater than
50% of the total percentage of debt increase captured on the SCF. For example, if
debt increases $100 and the SCF captures that entire $100 increase, and $75 of the
$100 captured on the SCF is used for acquisitions, then the primary use of funds is
classified as long-term investment.
As an example of the SCF screen, in 2002 the market leverage of Lee Enterprises,
a publishing company, doubled from 11% (in 2001) to 22% as a result of an increase
of $235 million in total debt, which corresponded to an increase in net debt37 of $494
million. Based on the SCF, the proceeds from the issue were used for an increase in
long-term investment of $675 million. Therefore, the use of funds comprises 136% of
the increase in net debt, well in excess of the 80% threshold I require. (Note that
percentages greater than 100% are not uncommon, as firms often have additional
sources of funds, such as equity, that they use to fund operational needs). Additionally,
because the percentage of the increase in net debt attributable to long-term investment
was greater than the percentage attributable to the other three potential uses, the
screening process flags long-term investment as the primary use of funds. A reading
of the firm’s 10-K for that year confirms that it took on the additional debt in order
to help finance the acquisition of Howard Publication Co.38
37Net debt is equal to total debt minus cash holdings. See Gamba and Triantis 2008 for a
discussion of how debt issuance costs can lead firms to hold cash despite having outstanding debt.
38As another example of the increases I identify, in 2013 the market leverage of MDC Holdings Co
increased to 42% from 31% in 2012. This was the result of an increase in total debt of $337.5 million,
which corresponded to an increase in net debt of $298 million. Based on the SCF, the proceeds from
the issue were used for an increase in long-term investment of $60 million, as well as an increase in
working capital of $233 million. Therefore, the use of funds comprises 98% of the increase in net debt,
well in excess of the 80% threshold I require. Additionally, because the percentage of the increase in
net debt attributable to increases in working capital was greater than the percentage attributable to
the other three potential uses, the screening process flags working capital as the primary use of funds.
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A.2 Identifying Large Proactive Increases in Equity
I identify large increases in equity using two methods. First, I define large, proactive
increases in equity (LPIEs) in a manner analogous to the definition of LPIDs described
above. The only difference is the following. Because I am interested in increases in
equity that result in a significant change in leverage, I require that leverage decreased
by more than 0.1 relative to the previous year. This is simply the opposite of the
criterion for large debt increases. Furthermore, I measure changes in book leverage,
as opposed to market leverage. That is, I require the following two criteria: (1) total
book equity increased relative to the previous year, and (2) book leverage decreased
by more than 0.1 relative to the previous year.
As an alternative method of identifying large equity increases, I use the definition
of McKeon 2015, which measures whether the firm issued new stock equal to 3% or
more of its total equity in a given year. This identifies “firm-initiated issues,” such
as IPOs, SEOs, or private placements, as opposed to “employee-initiated issues” that
occur because of stock option exercise.
82
